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THE COPYRIGHT/PATENT BOUNDARY
Viva R. Moffat *
INTRODUCTION
In passing the Copyright Act in 1976, Congress provided that
"pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" were to be protected,
but at the same time made clear that works of industrial design,
as opposed to works of applied art, were not to be protected by
copyright law.' Put simply, "useful articles" are not copyrighta-
ble.2 This is so because useful things belong in the patent realm, if
they are to receive protection at all. Seemingly straightforward,
this distinction-between applied art and industrial design, be-
tween copyright law and patent law-has long perplexed policy-
makers, courts, and academics.
While the law and the language, as shall be seen, can be jar-
gon-filled and obscure, at issue is a straightforward and real-
world concern: whether and to what extent items like bicycle
racks, smartphones, belt buckles, mannequins, and all manner of
everyday products ought to be protected by some kind of exclusive
right. Put another way, the question is whether copyright pro-
vides the proper form of protection for items of industrial design.
This article concludes emphatically that, while some kind of
protection-that is, some kind of restriction on copying, be it de-
sign patent, trade dress, or a sui generis form of protection-may
be appropriate, copyright law is not the right approach. More spe-
cifically, "not copyright" for industrial design is sufficiently im-
* Associate Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I presented this
article at the Intellectual Property Scholars Conference at Stanford Law School, and ap-
preciate the comments from many in attendance, including Mark McKenna, Jerome
Reichman, Rebecca Tushnet, and Samson Vermont. I also thank Sarah Burstein, Bernard
Chao, Alan Chen, Robert Denicola, Laura Heymann, and Sam Kamin for valuable feed-
back and Amanda Walck for outstanding research assistance.
1. Copyright Act of 1976 § 101, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
2. I use the term "useful articles" to refer to useful items or useful aspects of items
that also have aesthetic elements.
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portant that a bright-line rule excluding industrial design from
copyright, in contrast to the nuanced standards currently em-
ployed, should be adopted.
A bright-line "not copyright" approach is important because if
there is uncertainty, industrial designers are likely to pursue
copyright rather than patent protection. This undermines the pa-
tent system and subverts the goals of that regime and of the fed-
eral intellectual property system generally. Patent law protects
new, useful, and nonobvious inventions.' The examination process
is rigorous and expensive; many inventions receive no protection;
those inventions that do receive protection are injected into the
public domain after the twenty-year patent term expires.4 This
last aspect is particularly noteworthy: useful inventions are free
for all to copy after the patent term has expired. Under this quid
pro quo, the inventor gets strong monopoly rights in exchange for
releasing the work to the public after twenty years. Many inven-
tors and designers might, however, prefer copyright protection if
it were available. Copyright offers protection that is not as strong
as patent, but it is vastly easier to obtain, in terms of time and
money, and lasts much, much longer.' If there is to be any mean-
ing to the hurdles patent law places in the way of protection, cop-
yright law cannot allow an end run around those requirements.
Delineating the boundary between copyright and patent law is
thus fundamentally important to the federal intellectual property
regime and to the goals of the patent system in particular. Draw-
ing that line in the context of applied art and industrial design
has proven to be particularly difficult, however.
In the deliberations leading up to the passage of the 1976
Copyright Act, Congress indicated that it intended to provide pro-
tection for the aesthetic aspects of useful articles to the extent
those elements are "physically or conceptually separable" from
the useful aspects of the work.' When there is physical separabil-
ity-as with, for example, a Mickey Mouse telephone-the analy-
3. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (new, useful inventions); id. § 103 (nonobviousness). To be
clear, I am drawing a distinction here between copyrights and utility patents.
4. Id. § 154(a)(2).
5. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012) (for individually authored, nonanonymous works, the
copyright term is the life of the author plus seventy years).
6. There is a long history pre-dating the 1976 Act, see infra notes 140-41 and the
sources cited therein, but it is the conceptual separability notion, brought to the fore by
the 1976 Act, that is the currently vexatious problem.
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sis is relatively simple. The sculptural aspects of a Mickey Mouse
telephone can be distinguished easily from the operable telephone
components! One can imagine taking a hacksaw or some other
tool and removing the old-school telephone pieces.
As in so many areas of the law, however, the easy cases are
easy and the difficult cases are confounding. According to the leg-
islative history, even when there is no physical separability, there
might be "conceptual separability."' This has been a much more
vexing issue for the courts to address.' While the theory is
straightforward-design elements are protectable, useful ele-
ments are not protectable-the application has proven to be quite
thorny."o The courts have developed a multitude of tests, none of
which has turned out to be either practically or theoretically sat-
isfying.
Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co. pro-
vides an illuminating example." The case involved the "ribbon"
bicycle rack.'" Familiar to many, the bicycle rack is described as
both "elegant" and "functional" by the Industrial Designers Socie-
ty of America.'" It is installed all over the world as a bicycle rack,
and it is in the permanent collection of the Museum of Modern
Art. 4 It is iconic in and of itself, and it is an iconic example of the
difficulty of determining "conceptual separability." The aesthetic
and functional elements of the bicycle rack are not physically
separable. Unlike the Mickey Mouse telephone, one cannot imag-
ine taking a hacksaw and cutting off the aesthetic or design ele-
ments of the ribbon rack. Determining whether these elements
7. The Mickey Mouse telephone example is borrowed from ROBERT P. MERGES, ET
AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 492 (6th ed. 2012). An im-
age of a Mickey Mouse phone is easy to find on the internet. See, e.g., PHONE PHUN
NOVELTY TELEPHONES, http://www.noveltytelephone.com/products/talkingmickey.html
(last visited Dec. 6, 2013).
8. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668;
see infra Part I.A.
9. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
12. Id. at 1143. The Ribbon Rack is in the shape of a sound wave, more or less. An im-
age is available on Brandir's website. BRANDIR INTERNATIONAL, INC., http://www.ribbon
rack.com (last visited Dec. 6, 2013).
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are "conceptually separable" is a problem of almost metaphysical
dimensions. 15
In Brandir, the Second Circuit discussed the variety of tests
that had been used and ultimately settled on a test proposed by
Professor Robert Denicola in a 1983 law review article." Only
seven years after the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976, Den-
icola's influential article was just one of a number of proposals
aimed at shaping the judicial approach to the useful article prob-
lem.17 The Brandir case is notable for its adoption of the Denicola
test and for its recitation of the other tests used by the Second
Circuit and other courts. In that case alone, the court discusses
three or four formulations of a test for conceptual separability."
Since the Brandir case, courts and scholars have continued to
struggle with the conceptual separability problem. This article
suggests a few reasons for this difficulty.
The first is that very few of the current tests or proposals even
acknowledge, much less incorporate, the broader policy reasons
for excluding useful articles from copyright protection. Nearly all
of the proposals address the fact that Congress has sought to dis-
tinguish between applied art and industrial design, but virtually
none of them explains why. The second, somewhat counterintui-
tive, drawback of the existing proposals is that many of them
seek to delineate the exact contours of what is "aesthetic" or "art"
or "artistic." This leads to complicated, fact-intensive, unpredicta-
ble tests that fail either to "get it right" or to advance the underly-
ing purpose of the useful article doctrine.
These two observations, taken together, lead in a new direc-
tion. When it is acknowledged that the primary reason to exclude
useful articles from copyright protection is to ensure that copy-
right does not intrude on either patent law or on the free copying
of unpatented industrial designs, it becomes clear that drawing a
15. Michael J. Lynch, Copyright in Utilitarian Objects: Beneath Metaphysics, 16 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 647, 647 (1991) (citations omitted) ("Among the opportunities for meta-
physicians provided by the Copyright Act of 1976, the scheme for protection of design fea-
tures of useful articles stands out.").
16. Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145-46 (citing Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Indus-
trial Design: A Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707,
741 (1983)).
17. E.g., Denicola, supra note 16, at 708 & n.7 (claiming that "alternative proposals
have become a congressional fixture, spawning a raft of conflicting academic analysis" and
citing a publication by the U.S. Copyright Office summarizing this literature).
18. Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1144-46.
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bright line is more important than ensuring the correctness of the
nuances and contours of the line. Quite a number of scholars and
industry insiders have advocated for a sui generis regime of pro-
tection for industrial design.'" This article remains agnostic as to
that possibility, but it should be noted that a bright-line "not
copyright" approach for useful articles would aid in the effective
operation of such a system if enacted.20
In devising a new approach, this article borrows from trade-
mark law. Though not perfectly analogous, of course, trademark
law is instructive because it has a channeling doctrine and a rela-
tively bright-line rule animated by the overarching policy concern
of excluding functional items from trademark law in order to pre-
serve the patent bargain and the freedom to copy unpatented use-
ful items. Trademark's functionality doctrine is not concerned
primarily with defining what is trademarkable." Instead, it is fo-
cused on what is functional and explicitly errs on the side of un-
der-protection. Under that doctrine, an item will not receive
trademark protection if it is functional, even if it satisfies the
trademark criteria in other ways.22
The approach proposed here similarly errs on the side of under-
protection, incorporating this same burden-shifting, default-
creating rule. Some items will be copyrightable-fixed, original
expression-but nonetheless excluded from the copyright realm.
In an infringement suit, the copyright proponent, even though it
will have a copyright registration in hand, must demonstrate that
its work is not useful if the useful article doctrine is raised as a
defense. 2 Placing this burden on the copyright plaintiff will make
19. See infra Part II.B.
20. In other words, the bright-line rule proposed here would help channel works of
industrial design away from copyright law. Where those works might end up-the public
domain, patent law, or a sui generis regime-is beyond the scope of this article. In the
wake of the Apple v. Samsung verdict, there has been a resurgence of interest in design
patent law. See, e.g., Sarah Burstein, Moving Beyond the Standard Criticisms of Design
Patents, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (copy on file with the author) (arguing
that the standard criticisms of the design patent system are not as strong as they appear
and that they only obscure the crucial policy questions); Mark P. McKenna & Katherine J.
Strandburg, Progress and Competition in Design, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming
2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2355445 (arguing
that if the design patent system can be justified it is on the basis that it protects items
that blend form and function, items at the intersection of aesthetics and utility).
21. See infra Part III.A.1.
22. This is true at least in theory. The Lanham Act explicitly shifts the burden of
proof to the trademark proponent to prove nonfunctionality. See infra Part III.A.1.
23. The Copyright Act differs from the Lanham Act in that it requires registration
2014]1 615
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it substantially more difficult for the plaintiff to prevail, as it
makes clear that in the close cases there should be a finding of no
copyright protection.
Creating this new default position is the most significant as-
pect of the approach proposed here. As for the copyright propo-
nent's specific burden of proof in demonstrating non-usefulness,
there are a few possibilities. The first is a rule of physical separa-
bility: if the copyright proponent demonstrates that the aesthetic
elements can be physically separated from the useful aspects of
the work, the aesthetic elements may be protected. Another ap-
proach borrows even more from trademark law: the copyright
proponent must demonstrate that the elements sought to be pro-
tected are neither essential to the use or purpose of the work nor
do they affect the cost or quality of the work.24 The first approach
provides a very bright-line that errs greatly on the side of "not
copyright." The second possibility brings with it many of the prob-
lems inherent in trademark's functionality doctrine, but it has
the benefit of the Supreme Court's imprimatur and some pre-
existing judicial experience with the doctrine.
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly summarizes
the statutory language and legislative history concerning the use-
ful article doctrine. The discussion then turns to the purposes of
the doctrine and demonstrates that the underlying goal is to
channel useful works away from copyright law in order to protect
the integrity of the patent system. In other words, the doctrine is
less about copyright law than it is about the intellectual property
regime in a broader sense. Part II catalogs the current judicial
approaches to the useful article doctrine, along with the multi-
before an infringement suit can be commenced. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2012) ("[N]o
civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted
until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance
with this title."), with Lanham Act of 1946 § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012) ("Any person
who, on or in connection with any goods or services ... uses in commerce any word, term,
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin,
false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact,
which ... is likely to cause confusion ... shall be liable in a civil action. .. ."). Thus, a
copyright plaintiff will always have a copyright registration certificate. The same is not
true in trademark law: a trademark plaintiff may sue on an unregistered mark. The bur-
den-shifting will therefore operate somewhat differently in copyright cases than it does in
trademark cases. See infra Part III.A.
24. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001) (quoting
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995)) (discussing the two-part test
for functionality in the context of trademark law).
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tude of proposals for reform. Nearly all of them share two charac-
teristics. The first is a failure to identify, either explicitly or im-
plicitly, the policy purpose underlying the useful article doctrine.
The second is a direct result of this failure: the tests and pro-
posals are overly focused on getting the copyright questions right,
and thus do not effectively channel industrial design away from
copyright law. In Part III, the article proposes a different ap-
proach. Borrowing from trademark's channeling doctrine, func-
tionality, the copyright owner ought to bear the burden of proving
non-usefulness. There are a number of possibilities for the ele-
ments to be shown by the copyright proponent in order to over-
come the burden, and two of them are discussed in this final part.
I. USEFUL ARTICLES, CONCEPTUAL SEPARABILITY, AND
COPYRIGHT CHANNELING
This part briefly summarizes the legislative background of the
useful article doctrine and then makes the case that the doctrine
is animated by concerns not just about copyright law, but about
the broader intellectual property regime and patent law in par-
ticular. The doctrine should operate to cleanly channel works
away from copyright so that designers are not tempted to take
copyright's advantages over patent's requirements, but, as will be
demonstrated in Part II, the channeling effect, if any, of the cur-
rent approaches is hardly clean.
A. The Useful Article Doctrine and Conceptual Separability:
Legislative Background
The 1976 Copyright Act protects "pictorial, graphic, and sculp-
tural works,"2 5 allowing copyright protection for a broad range of
artistic works, as well as industrial designs such as bicycle racks,
mannequins, smartphones, and so on, which may be deemed
sculptural works. The owner of a copyright in a "PGS" work has
the right to control copies and derivatives of the work, the right to
distribution, and the right to display the work.26 Notwithstanding
the broad language of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works,"
the Copyright Act makes clear that useful articles, or, more accu-
25. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2012).
26. Id. § 106(1)-(3), (5) (2012).
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rately, any useful aspects of a work, are excluded from protection.
The definition states that "PGS" works
shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form
but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the de-
sign of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be considered
a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent
that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural fea-
tures that can be identified separately from, and are capable of exist-
ing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.
A "useful article" is defined as an item "having an intrinsic utili-
tarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of
the article or to convey information.""
The language of the Copyright Act is quite clear: useful arti-
cles, or aspects of works that are useful, are not the proper sub-
ject of copyright protection. Designs of useful articles are protect-
able only if they can be identified separately and if they exist
independently of the utilitarian aspects." As will be demonstrat-
ed below, however, the policy animating this rule is less clear.
Perhaps for that reason, the application of the useful article doc-
trine has presented substantial difficulties.
There is scant legislative history concerning the doctrine. The
brief discussion in the House Report does not discuss the reasons
for the general principle articulated in the statute, nor does it
27. Id. § 101 (2012) (definition of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works).
28. Id. (definition of a "useful article").
29. Congress considered-and then rejected-the possibility of providing copyright
protection for designs not separable from or independent of the utilitarian aspects of the
article. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 50 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5663
(describing a provision passed by the Senate that would have created "a new limited form
of copyright protection for 'original' designs which are clearly part of a useful article, re-
gardless of whether such designs could stand by themselves, separate from the article it-
self."). The House Report states that this provision was rejected "in part because the new
form of design protection . .. could not truly be considered copyright protection and there-
fore appropriately within the scope of copyright revision." Id. The House Report does not
state why such protection was outside the scope of copyright. It certainly may be because
protection of useful aspects of a work more properly belongs in the patent realm. Congress
seems to have contemplated some alternative form of "design protection" and left for fur-
ther consideration whether "creat[ing] a new monopoly" would be justified. Id. Concluding,
the legislative history states that "the Committee believes that it will be necessary to re-
consider the question of design protection in new legislation during [the next session]. At
that time more complete hearings on the subject may be held and, without the encum-
brance of a general copyright revision bill, the issues ... may be resolved." Id. Those is-




present a test or rule for resolving the close cases."o A significant
portion of the Report's language follows and is instructive for
what it includes-note the italics in the excerpt-and what is
omitted:
In adopting this amendatory language, the Committee is seeking to
draw as clear a line as possible between copyrightable works of ap-
plied art and uncopyrighted works of industrial design. A two-
dimensional painting, drawing, or graphic work is still capable of be-
ing identified as such when it is printed on or applied to utilitarian
articles such as textile fabrics, wallpaper, containers, and the like.
The same is true when a statue or carving is used to embellish an
industrial product or, as in the Mazer case, is incorporated into a
product without losing its ability to exist independently as a work of
art. On the other hand, although the shape of an industrial product
may be aesthetically satisfying and valuable, the Committee's inten-
tion is not to offer it copyright protection under the bill. Unless the
shape of an automobile, airplane, ladies' dress, food processor, televi-
sion set, or any other industrial product contains some element that,
physically or conceptually, can be identified as separable from the
utilitarian aspects of that article, the design would not be copyrighted
under the bill. The test of separability and independence from "the
utilitarian aspects of the article" does not depend upon the nature of
the design-that is, even if the appearance of an article is deter-
mined by esthetic (as opposed to functional) considerations, only el-
ements, if any, which can be identified separately from the useful ar-
30. It must be noted that this brief discussion of the legislative history barely skims
the surface of the long, and somewhat tortuous, history of protection for industrial design.
This is not a recent problem, and it is not only a problem in the United States. The full
scope of this history has been elucidated most fully by Professor Jerome Reichman. See
J.H. Reichman, Design Protection After the Copyright Act of 1976: A Comparative View of
the Emerging Interim Models, 31 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 267 (1984) [hereinafter,
Reichman, Design After 1976; J.H. Reichman, Design Protection and the Legislative Agen-
da, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 281 (1992) [hereinafter, Reichman, Legislative Agenda];
J.H. Reichman, Design Protection and the New Technologies: The United States Experience
in a Transnational Perspective, 19 U. BALT. L. REV. 6 (1989) [hereinafter, Reichman, De-
sign Protection and New Technologies]; J.H. Reichman, Design Protection in Domestic and
Foreign Copyright Law: From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976,
1983 DUKE L.J. 1143 (1983) [hereinafter, Reichman, Design Before 1976; J.H. Reichman,
Past and Current Trends in the Evolution of Design Protection Law-A Comment, 4
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 387 (1993) [hereinafter, Reichman, Past and
Current Trends]. Professor Reichman's work in this area is nothing short of overwhelming-
ly impressive. It is impossible to summarize Reichman's approach in a single article, much
less a footnote. For this footnote, suffice it to say that Reichman describes industrial de-
sign as "the intellectual property world's single most complicated puzzle." Reichman, Past
and Current Trends, supra, at 387. He summarizes the history of industrial design protec-
tion as follows: "[F]rom a worldwide perspective, we thus find a recurring cyclical pattern
that swings from states of chronic underprotection to states of chronic overprotection, and
then back to underprotection once again. This two hundred-year-old cyclical pattern con-
tinues to unfold before our eyes." Id. at 388.
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ticle as such are copyrightable. And, even if the three-dimensional
design contains some such element (for example, a carving on the
back of a chair or a floral relief design on silver flatware), copyright
protection would extend only to that element, and would not cover
31
the over-all configuration of the utilitarian article as such.
Note that the report indicates that even aesthetically pleasing el-
ements of a work-that is, otherwise copyrightable elements-
may not be copyrighted if they cannot be identified separately
from the functional elements. The report mentions "conceptual
separability" in this regard, and it is that phrase that has led to
substantial doctrinal difficulty.3 2 What is missing from the Report
is an explanation of the reasons for excluding useful articles from
copyright protection. Understanding what animates the useful
article doctrine would go a long way to resolving questions about
how best to formulate and apply the doctrine.
B. Why Exclude Useful Articles from Copyright Protection?
The 1976 Copyright Act and the minimal legislative history re-
garding the useful article doctrine both indicate quite clearly that
copyright law ought not protect useful articles, but there is little
evidence concerning the reasons for the articulation of this prin-
ciple. Neither the statute nor the legislative history states why it
was felt important to draw this line between copyrightable works
of applied art and uncopyrightable items of industrial design.
Although the legislative history is scant, by looking there as well
as to a variety of other sources, it is reasonable to conclude that
the primary purpose of the "useful article" doctrine is to police the
boundary between copyright law and patent law." In other words,
31. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 55 (emphasis added).
32. See, e.g., Barton R. Keyes, Note, Alive and Well: The (Still) Ongoing Debate Sur-
rounding Conceptual Separability in American Copyright Law, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 109, 110-
12 (2008) (discussing the conceptual separability doctrine post Copyright Act of 1976 and
outlining the lack of uniform doctrinal stability among the federal courts of appeals in de-
veloping and applying this doctrine).
33. This conclusion is in some ways obvious; there are casebook references and some-
times a throwaway line in a case. On the other hand, there is very little discussion of it in
the legislative history, the case law, or the literature. See e.g., MERGES, ET AL., supra note
7, at 491 ("Awarding protection for functional works through copyright law-with its low
threshold for protection and much greater duration-would undermine the role of the pa-
tent system as the principal means for protecting utilitarian works and hinder the process
of sequential innovation essential to technological progress. Does the useful article doc-
trine reflect a similar objective?"). But see Pivot Point Int'l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc.,
620 [Vol. 48:611
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the useful article doctrine is a channeling doctrine, meant to di-
rect works away from the copyright realm and toward patent law,
the public domain, or, perhaps, some other form of protection. In
this section, I argue that this is the case, so far as can be deter-
mined, as a descriptive matter, and that, as a normative matter,
this is the best justification for the useful article doctrine.
1. The Structure of the Intellectual Property Regimes
Some evidence that the purpose of the useful article doctrine is
to channel certain works away from copyright law can be gleaned
from the structure and nature of the federal intellectual property
regimes. In particular, the comparison between patent law and
copyright is instructive. Patent law provides substantially
stronger rights than copyright law, yet the rights are much more
difficult to obtain and last only twenty years, as compared to cop-
yright's "life plus 70" nearly endless term.34 Based on those differ-
ences alone, some inventors and designers might well prefer cop-
yright over patent protection. 5
There are reasons to discourage some of these inventors and
designers from pursuing copyright protection, however. The pa-
tent system is often described as involving a "bargain" in which a
patent holder receives a package of exclusive rights in an inven-
tion for twenty years and, in exchange, the public, including com-
petitors, have a "right to copy" the invention once the patent ex-
pires.36 The rights that come along with a patent are potent: the
patent holder may exclude all others from making, using, or sell-
372 F.3d 913, 932 (7th Cir. 2004) (Kanne, J., dissenting) ("All functional items have aes-
thetic qualities. If copyright provided protection for functional items simply because of
their aesthetic qualities, Congress's policy choice that gives less protection in patent than
copyright would be undermined."); Am. Dental Ass'n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass'n, 126 F.3d
977, 980 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing the difference between the originality inquiry and use-
fulness: "A lamp may be entirely original, but if the novel elements are also functional the
lamp cannot be copyrighted. This is not a line between intellectual property and the public
domain; it is a line among bodies of intellectual-property law.").
34. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012), with 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
35. This is obviously not true for all inventors and designers, particularly those whose
works are likely to be quite remunerative (and therefore they would prefer patent's
stronger protections) yet their shelf life is relatively short (and therefore they are indiffer-
ent to copyright's longer term).
36. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. 1Iktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001) ("In gen-
eral, unless an intellectual property right such as a patent or copyright protects an item, it
will be subject to copying.").
2014] 621
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ing the patented invention," and the defenses to a claim of patent
infringement are few."
To the extent that the patent bargain involves the strong ver-
sion of a "right to copy" an unpatented item, then permitting oth-
er forms of protection for unpatented or formerly patented items
interferes with this right to copy aspect of the bargain. For exam-
ple, if an item that is under patent is also eligible for, and re-
ceives, copyright protection, that item cannot be freely copied
once the patent expires because the copyright term is so much
longer than the patent term. Even an "election" system, in which
an inventor or designer might elect copyright protection over pa-
tent protection, imposes upon the "right to copy" and thus inter-
feres with the patent bargain.
If the patent bargain is based on the policy decision that cer-
tain kinds of invention and innovation ought to be available for
free copying sooner rather than later-the notion that competi-
tion is more important in certain areas than in others"-that pol-
icy decision will be undermined if the terms of the patent bargain
can be avoided by a retreat to copyright law by inventors and de-
signers. Of the variety of potentially patentable items, it is the
products of industrial design that lay the strongest claim to copy-
rightability. In addition to being useful, works of industrial de-
sign are often also original, expressive works with substantial
aesthetic value. Thus, the potential problems involving the inter-
action between copyright and patent are most acute in this area,
and this is likely one reason the doctrine has presented such diffi-
culty. Works of industrial design do indeed lie at the copy-
right/patent boundary.
2. Legislative History
Even if the patent bargain does not contemplate a strong form
of the "right to copy" unpatented or formerly patented items-
that is, if the expiration of the patent term means only that pa-
tent rights no longer attach, but that other rights may preclude
37. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) ("[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to
sell, or sells any patented invention . . . infringes the patent.").
38. See id. § 282 (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
39. See Lynch, supra note 15, at 656 ("The judgment that a free market is more im-
portant in useful articles than in art and literature is corroborated in related areas of
American patent and trademark law.").
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copying-courts ought to hesitate before allowing copyright to
step into the breach with respect to items of industrial design.
The Copyright Act clearly states that useful articles are to be
excluded from copyright's purview, 40 and the legislative history
indicates that design protection was not passed at the time of the
Copyright Act's revision because it did not fit well within the
copyright scheme.4 ' According to the House Report, the design
protection portion of the legislation was rejected "in part because
[it] . . . could not truly be considered copyright protection and
therefore appropriately within the scope of copyright revision."42
Indeed, many legislators contemplated the passage of a sui gene-
ris regime.4 ' The fact that such a regime has not been enacted is
not a particularly good reason to expand copyright to include in-
dustrial design.
The legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act does not pro-
vide a clear statement concerning the purpose of the useful article
doctrine. This is likely because there was no uniform understand-
ing.44 The primary reference in the legislative history is to Mazer
v. Stein, a 1954 Supreme Court opinion.45 But only so much can be
drawn from this reference.
In Mazer, the Supreme Court considered copyright protection
for a statuette used as a lamp base." The manufacturer of the
lamp base obtained a copyright registration for the statuette and
sold copies, primarily as lamps. The manufacturer brought suit
against alleged infringers, and the issue ultimately presented to
the Supreme Court was whether a "work of art" could be copy-
righted if it was sold commercially.4" The Court emphatically re-
40. 17 U.S.C. § 113(b) (2012).
41. See supra note 29.
42. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 50 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5663.
43. See supra note 29.
44. See Reichman, Past and Current Trends, supra note 30, at 388 (describing the
evolving and cyclical nature of the approaches to design protection in the United States
and abroad).
45. 347 U.S. 201 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 105 ("Section 113 deals with the
extent of copyright protection in 'works of applied art.' The section takes as its starting
point the Supreme Court's decision in Mazer v. Stein. . .
46. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 203.
47. Id. at 202-03 ("[The statuettes were sold in quantity throughout the country both
as lamp bases and as statuettes. The sales in lamp form accounted for all but an insignifi-
cant portion of respondents' sales.").
48. Id. at 204-05 (simplifying the issue raised in the petition for certiorari and deter-
mining the question presented to be: "Can a lamp manufacturer copyright his lamp ba-
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jected the infringer's argument, asserting first that there was no
question that "works of the fine arts" were protected under the
Copyright Act, 49 and, second, that it did not matter whether those
works were reproduced in large quantities or sold commercially.0
These conclusions are consistent with the "nondiscrimination"
principle, which is based on the notion that judges are not partic-
ularly well-suited to making artistic judgments and that copy-
right law ought not attempt to distinguish between "fine art" and
"commercial art" or, more bluntly, good art and bad art." So,
clearly the commercial exploitation of a work of art does not bar
copyright protection, and this appears to be the primary holding
of the Court: "We find nothing in the copyright statute to support
the argument that the intended use or use in industry of an arti-
cle eligible for copyright bars or invalidates its registration."5 2
The legislative history, however, describes Mazer's holding as
follows: "works of art which are incorporated into the design of
useful articles, but which are capable of standing by themselves
as art works separate from the useful article, are copyrightable."5 3
This interpretation of the holding, even if not entirely accurate,
ses?").
49. Id. at 211-13. The Court stated that there was "a contemporaneous and long-
continued construction of the statutes by the agency charged to administer them that
would allow the registration of such a statuette as is in question here." Id. at 213.
50. Id. at 218 ("We find nothing in the copyright statute to support the argument that
the intended use or use in industry of an article eligible for copyright bars or invalidates
its registration.").
51. This principle was articulated in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111
US. 53, 58-60 (1884) and Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251
(1903). Mazer states the principle in this way: "Individual perception of the beautiful is too
varied a power to permit a narrow or rigid concept of art. . . . [Original] expression, wheth-
er meticulously delineating the model or mental image or conveying the meaning by mod-
ernistic form or color, is copyrightable." 347 U.S. at 214.
52. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 218.
53. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 50 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5663. It
is difficult to find this holding, at least explicitly, in Mazer v. Stein. Instead of articulating
a separability standard, the Supreme Court appears to be reaffirming the nondiscrimina-
tion principle and stating that the patentability of the item does not necessarily bar copy-
right. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217 ("We do hold that the patentability of the statuettes, fitted as
lamps or unfitted, does not bar copyright as works of art[.]"). It is unclear from this state-
ment whether the Court is contemplating some sort of separability in which the useful el-
ements may be patented and the original expressive elements may be copyrighted, or if
instead the Court assumes that the very same elements, if both useful and expressive,
may be awarded both copyright and patent protection. The Court references design patent
protection and does seem to indicate that the two might overlap without posing any prob-
lems: "The dichotomy of protection for the aesthetic is not beauty and utility but art for




appears to be what Congress intended to incorporate into the
1976 Act, and it is certainly consistent with the statutory lan-
guage as enacted. Neither the legislative history of the 1976 Act
nor Mazer v. Stein mentions channeling or the interaction be-
tween copyright law and patent law.54
In conjunction with the references to Mazer v. Stein, Congress
referenced proposed "design legislation" that it ultimately reject-
ed as part of the new copyright act. That legislation would have
created
a new limited form of copyright protection for "original" designs
which are clearly a part of a useful article, regardless of whether
such designs could stand by themselves, separate from the article it-
self. Thus designs of useful articles which do not meet the desigi pa-
tent standard of "novelty" would for the first time be protected.
Congress declined to pass this legislation, "in part because the
new form of design protection . . . could not truly be considered
copyright protection" and left it for later consideration." While
many in Congress evidently anticipated that a sui generis regime
for industrial design would eventually be enacted," that has not
yet occurred."
From the legislative history of the 1976 Act, including from the
references to Mazer v. Stein, one can learn little regarding the
purpose of the useful article doctrine except (1) that Congress did
not consider industrial design to fall within the scope of the pro-
posed copyright legislation, (2) that it might consider such protec-
tion later, and (3) that some kind of overlapping copyright and
design legislation was not necessarily inappropriate."
54. Mazer does indicate that industrial design might be eligible for both copyright pro-
tection and design patent protection, but it does not mention utility patents. 347 U.S. at
218. For an in-depth discussion of various possibilities of cumulation of protection, see
Reichman, Legislative Agenda, supra note 30, at 288.
55. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 50.
56. Id.; see Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("In rejecting
proposed Title II, Congress noted the administration's concern that to make such designs
eligible for copyright would be to create a 'new monopoly' having obvious and significant
anticompetitive effects.").
57. See Reichman, Design Before 1976, supra note 30, at 1147-48.
58. As discussed below, a variety of specialized regimes have been proposed in the
years since the passage of the 1976 Act. See infra Part II.B.
59. Simultaneous copyright and design patent protection may present some of the
same difficulties as overlapping copyright and utility patent protection, but in the 1976
Act, Congress apparently contemplated concurrent or overlapping copyright and design
patent protection. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 50.
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Although this portion of the legislative history is less than per-
fectly clear,6 0 we do know that Congress intended that the "useful"
aspects of works should not receive copyright protection.6' It is a
bit of a leap-although not an unreasonable one-to conclude
that this is because "useful" items fall within the realm of utility
patents. In other words, one justification for the useful article
doctrine is to separate and draw a boundary between copyrighta-
ble expressive works and patentable useful inventions.
The conclusion that the very structure of the federal intellectu-
al property system provides evidence as to the channeling pur-
pose of the useful article doctrine is to some extent descriptive.
The copyright statute and the legislative history provide some
support for this view. There is some evidence that Congress was
concerned with and motivated by a concern about channeling
items or works to the patent realm, but the strength and contours
of their commitment to this principle are not entirely clear.62
The "not copyright" view of protection for industrial design does
find substantial support in the statute and legislative history. As
described above, the copyright statute states that useful articles
may not be protected by copyright and indicates that the aesthet-
ic aspects of those works must be identified and exist separately
60. Many of the Court's references to "patents" in Mazer v. Stein appear to be refer-
ences to design patents rather than utility patents. For example, the Court describes the
petitioner's argument as asserting "that congressional enactment of the design patent
laws should be interpreted as denying protection to artistic articles embodied or repro-
duced in manufactured articles." Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 215 (1954). The Court ends
that paragraph, stating:
Petitioner urges that overlapping of patent and copyright legislation so as to
give an author or inventor a choice between patents and copyrights should
not be permitted. We assume petitioner takes the position that protection for
a statuette for industrial use can only be obtained by patent, if any protection
can be given.
Id. at 216. In the next paragraph, the Court holds "that the patentability of the statuettes,
fitted as lamps or unfitted, does not bar copyright as works of art[.] Neither the Copyright
Statute nor any other says that because a thing is patentable it may not be copyrighted."
Id. at 217. This is somewhat ambiguous language. The Court appears to be talking about
the copyright/design patent overlap but does not say so explicitly and seems to be more
concerned with the nondiscrimination principle than with whether useful articles may be
protected by copyright.
61. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works to exclude
the utilitarian aspects of those works).
62. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 55 ("[The Committee is seeking to draw as clear a




from the useful elements.6 3 Finally, the fact that patent law pro-
tects "useful" articles and that copyright law excludes "useful" ar-
ticles provides some evidence of an intent to create separate
spheres of protection, in that the very subject matter of patent
law and copyright law is distinct. The conclusions drawn from the
structure of the intellectual property system are also animated by
a normative perspective concerning the value of the freedom to
copy. That view arises more from the Supreme Court's jurispru-
dence in related areas than it does from the Copyright Act.
3. Trademark Law and Patent Preemption
In related contexts, Congress and the courts have indicated
that allowing non-patent protection for patented, formerly pa-
tented, or potentially patentable items interferes with the goals of
the patent system.64 The scope and strength of this policy goal is
less than perfectly clear, but the rough outlines of the notion have
been fairly consistent. In addressing trademark protection for
items that have been or might have been patented, Congress and
the Supreme Court have articulated the "functionality" doctrine,
by which functional aspects of an item may not receive trademark
protection." Similarly, the Court has applied preemption doctrine
to prohibit states from providing rights that overlap with federal
patent rights in some cases.66 Although it is not clear the extent to
63. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of pictorial, graphical, and sculptural works).
64. See Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1507-08
(10th Cir. 1995) (discussing the purposes of the Patent Act); see also Dastar Corp. v. Twen-
tieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003) (quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc. v.
Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (regarding
the possible conflict between trademark protection in the Lanham Act and patent protec-
tion, the Supreme Court held that the Lanham Act "does not exist to reward manufactur-
ers for their innovation in creating a particular device; that is the purpose of the patent
law and its period of exclusivity"); Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Pa-
tents: The Problem of Overlapping Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1473, 1515 (2004) (discussing the consequential effects of concurrent (or overlapping)
copyright patent protection, and stating: "If the goal is to strengthen or expand the rights
of intellectual property owners, providing increased incentives within any given legal re-
gime, rather than allowing overlap, best serves the goals of the intellectual property sys-
tem.").
65. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (2012); see also TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 30-31 (noting that
a prior utility patent on a dual-spring design mechanism demonstrated a strong inference
of the mechanism's functionality, thus precluding petitioner's attempt to obtain trade
dress protection for the design).
66. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964) (quoting Sola
Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942) ("When state law touches upon
the area of these federal statutes, it is 'familiar doctrine' that the federal policy 'may not
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which courts or Congress are willing to apply the principle that
unpatented useful or functional items ought to be free to copy, the
principle persists. From these sources, it is reasonable to infer
that the principle is one of the motivating factors for the useful
article doctrine in copyright law.
a. Trademark Law
In the context of trademark law, a relatively bright line has
been drawn, with both Congress and the courts making clear that
"functional" marks may not be protected because protecting func-
tional items is the province of patent law." Trademark's function-
ality doctrine serves to channel useful items to the patent realm.
Functional elements of trade dress will not receive trademark
protection, even if they would otherwise be trademarkable and
even if they have not been or could not be patented.
The Lanham Act provides that the trade dress proponent must
prove that the trade dress is not functional." In TrafFix v. MDI,
the Supreme Court emphasized that the functionality doctrine
serves to direct works away from trademark law even when those
be set at naught, or its benefits denied' by state law."); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thun-
der Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989) (holding that the federal policy favoring free
competition in ideas not meriting patent protection preempted a Florida statute prohibit-
ing the use of a molding process that duplicated unpatented boat hulls or the sale thereof).
67. The Supreme Court has also expressed its commitment to the broad channeling
principle in the copyright/trademark context. In Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp., the Court held that a party could not assert trademark rights in a video series
in which the copyright had expired, stating that "[t]o hold otherwise would be akin to find-
ing that § 43(a) created a species of perpetual patent and copyright, which Congress may
not do." 539 U.S. at 37-38. In this context, the Court explicitly referenced patent law and
copyright in resolving a trademark question. Id. at 37. I discussed the Dastar case in a
previous article, arguing that the Court asserted a strong policy preference for clearly de-
lineating the boundaries of the federal intellectual property regimes and for a strong ver-
sion of the "right to copy" formerly copyrighted and patented items but that it has not ar-
ticulated this principle consistently over time or across different areas of intellectual
property law. See Moffat, supra note 64, at 1475-76 ("Both mutant copyrights and back-
door patents arise in a variety of situations that the Court has not addressed. Further, the
Court's doctrine is both incomplete and flawed when viewed in the larger context of over-
lapping protection."); see also Laura A. Heymann, The Trademark/Copyright Divide, 60
SMU L. REV. 55, 58-59 (2007) (asserting that "[w]ere courts to be more vigilant about po-
licing the line between copyright claims and non-copyright claims ... we might see a
world in which the broad injunctive relief available to prevailing copyright owners appears
less frequently" and critiquing Dastar on different grounds).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (2012) ("In a civil action for trade dress infringement under
this chapter for trade dress not registered on the principal register, the person who asserts




works are not patentable. 9 In reaching these conclusions, the
Court referenced the beneficial effects of copying. According to the
Court, "[t]rade dress protection must subsist with the recognition
that in many instances there is no prohibition against copying
goods and products. . .. Allowing competitors to copy will have
salutary effects in many instances."o In other words, the trade-
mark functionality doctrine is justified on the basis of concerns
broader than those confined to trademark alone. In particular,
the Court has indicated that providing trademark protection for
functional items might impact the "right to copy" that patent law
contemplates.' As the Court has indicated, free copying of useful
items is perhaps a general norm, with patent protection being the
exception: "In general, unless an intellectual property right such
as a patent or copyright protects an item, it will be subject to
copying."7 2
As Professor Mark McKenna points out, courts have not been
very clear about whether this "right to copy" takes a strong
form-that all non-patented items may be copied-or a weaker
form-allowing for copying when there is a competitive need.
The argument for the "right to copy" approach to trademark's
functionality doctrine is that the goals of the patent system will
be undermined if trade dress protection can be obtained in addi-
tion to or instead of patent protection. Inventors will, under
some circumstances at least, choose trade dress protection over
patent protection (to achieve a longer term of protection, for ex-
ample, or to avoid the difficulty and cost of pursuing patent pro-
69. 532 U.S. at 32, 34.
70. Id. at 29.
71. Id. at 34-35.
72. Id. at 29.
73. Mark P. McKenna, (Dys)Functionality, 48 Hous. L. REV. 823, 824 (2011)
("[D]espite its potential power [as the only true trademark defense], the functionality doc-
trine is quite inconsistently applied. This is true of mechanical functionality cases because
courts differ over the extent to which the doctrine focuses on competitors' right to copy un-
patented features as opposed to their need to copy."). While Professor McKenna suggests
that the solution to this dispute lies in a clearer understanding of fair competition in
trademark law, it is possible that the matter could be resolved by looking to patent law
instead. If the force and terms of the "patent bargain" were clarified, the problem as it is
expressed in the trademark context might be more manageable.
74. See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 36-37
(2008). Previously, the Court noted that copyright and patent protections "are part of a
'carefully crafted bargain,' under which, once the patent or copyright monopoly has ex-
pired, the public may use the invention or work at will and without attribution." Id. at 33-
34 (internal citations omitted).
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tection) or in addition to patent protection." In TrafFix, the Court
made clear that the functionality doctrine operated to preclude
trademark protection for any functional or useful aspect of a
product, regardless of whether it was patented.16 Courts have in-
terpreted and applied the functionality doctrine in a variety of
ways. As it is presented in TrafFix, however, there can be no
doubt that the doctrine is designed to exclude functional items
from trademark protection because of the problems that would
pose with regard to patent law." How well the doctrine functions
to achieve this purpose, and the strength of the Supreme Court's
commitment to that purpose, are less clear.
b. Patent Preemption
Similar conclusions can be drawn from the Supreme Court's
patent preemption jurisprudence. As with the functionality doc-
trine, there are stronger and weaker versions of patent preemp-
tion, but the basic understanding is that states may not provide
patent-like protection for any items that might fall within pa-
tent's orbit. The strong version of this approach is exemplified in
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., in which the Court held that
"[a]n unpatentable article, like an article on which the patent has
expired, is in the public domain and may be made and sold by
whoever chooses to do so."" The Sears case, along with its com-
panion, Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc." sets forth the
general rule that unpatented and formerly patented items must
be free for all to copy. Both cases involved manufacturers of
75. McKenna, supra note 73, at 828 & n.20.
76. 532 U.S. at 29-30 ("A utility patent is strong evidence that the features therein
claimed are functional. If trade dress protection is sought for those features the strong ev-
idence of functionality based on the previous patent adds great weight to the statutory
presumption that features are deemed functional until proved otherwise by the party
seeking trade dress protection. Where the expired patent claimed the features in question,
one who seeks to establish trade dress protection must carry the heavy burden of showing
that the feature is not functional, for instance by showing that it is merely an ornamental,
incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the device."); see also id. at 32 ("[E]ven if there has been
no previous utility patent the party asserting trade dress has the burden to establish the
nonfunctionality of alleged trade dress features.").
77. McKenna, supra note 73, at 827-28 ("Functionality, according to the Supreme
Court, is not simply about competitive need for product features; it is also, even primarily,
intended to police the boundary between trademark and patent law by channeling protec-
tion of useful product features exclusively to the patent system.").
78. 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964).
79. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
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lamps suing under state unfair competition laws, seeking to pre-
vent unauthorized copying of the lighting fixtures.0 And in both
cases, the Court rather sweepingly declared the state law
preempted because it conflicted with patent policy by interfering
with the right to copy.
Not all of the Court's pronouncements have been so categorical,
however. As Professor McKenna describes, in Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,82
[W]hile the Court held that the statute was indeed preempted and
gave lip service to the general principle that patent protection is an
exception to a general rule of free copying, the Court clearly retreat-
ed from its statements in Sears and Compco that states could not
prevent copying of unpatented features themselves.
Notwithstanding this partial retreat," the issue addressed by the
Court evidences its concern about clarifying the boundaries of
state competition law so as to avoid conflicting with federal pa-
tent law: "We must decide today what limits the operation of the
federal patent system places on the States' ability to offer sub-
80. Id at 234-35; Sears, 376 U.S. at 225-26.
81. Compco, 376 U.S. at 237 ("Today we have held in Sears ... that when an article is
unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state law may not forbid others to copy that article.
To forbid copying would interfere with the federal policy, found in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the
Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes, of allowing free access to copy
whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain."). See Sears,
376 U.S. at 230-31 (footnotes omitted) ("Thus the patent system is one in which uniform
federal standards are carefully used to promote invention while at the same time preserv-
ing free competition. Obviously a State could not, consistently with the Supremacy Clause
of the Constitution, extend the life of a patent beyond its expiration date or give a patent
on an article which lacked the level of invention required for federal patents. To do either
would run counter to the policy of Congress of granting patents only to true inventions,
and then only for a limited time. Just as a State cannot encroach upon the federal patent
laws directly, it cannot, under some other law, such as that forbidding unfair competition,
give protection of a kind that clashes with the objectives of the federal patent laws.").
82. 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989) (holding a Florida statute protecting boat hull designs to
be preempted by federal patent law because it "so substantially impedes the public use of
the otherwise unprotected design and utilitarian ideas embodied in unpatented boat hulls
as to run afoul of the teaching of our decisions in Sears and Compco").
83. McKenna, supra note 73, at 840-41.
84. Indeed, in the case, the Court sought to limit the broad sweep of Sears and Comp-
co.
Read at their highest level of generality, the two decisions could be taken to
stand for the proposition that the States are completely disabled from offer-
ing any form of protection to articles or processes which fall within the broad
scope of patentable subject matter.... That the extrapolation of such a broad
pre-emptive principle from Sears is inappropriate is clear from the balance
struck in Sears itself.
Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 154.
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stantial protection to utilitarian and design ideas which the pa-
tent laws leave otherwise unprotected."" And the Court's rheto-
ric, at least, in addressing the issue is quite sweeping. In describ-
ing the "patent bargain," the Court states:
The attractiveness of such a bargain, and its effectiveness in induc-
ing creative effort and disclosure of the results of that effort, depend
almost entirely on a backdrop of free competition in the exploitation
of unpatented designs and innovations. The novelty and nonobvious-
ness requirements of patentability embody a congressional under-
standing, implicit in the Patent Clause itself, that free exploitation
of ideas will be the rule, to which the protection of a federal patent is
the exception. Moreover, the ultimate goal of the patent system is to
bring new designs and technologies into the public domain through
disclosure. State law protection for techniques and designs whose
disclosure has already been induced by market rewards may conflict
with the very purpose of the patent laws by decreasing the range of
ideas available as the building blocks of further innovation. The offer
of federal protection from competitive exploitation of intellectual
property would be rendered meaningless in a world where substan-
tially similar state law protections were readily available. To a lim-
ited extent, the federal patent laws must determine not only what is
protected, but also what is free for all to use.
The Court did indeed articulate a narrower view of patent
preemption in Bonito Boats," but the general principle remains:
85. Id. at 143. There is clearly room for some state regulation, as evidenced by the
Court's upholding of state trade secret laws. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416
U.S. 470 (1974); see also Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 155 (describing its holding in Kewanee
as follows: "Despite the fact that state law [trade secret] protection was available for ideas
which clearly fell within the subject matter of patent, the Court concluded that the nature
and degree of state protection did not conflict with the federal policies of encouragement of
patentable invention and the prompt disclosure of such innovations.").
86. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 151.
87. See id. at 154 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232
(1964)) ("That the extrapolation of such a broad pre-emptive principle from Sears is inap-
propriate is clear from the balance struck in Sears itself. The Sears Court made it plain
that the States 'may protect businesses in the use of their trademarks, labels, or distinc-
tive dress in the packaging of goods so as to prevent others, by imitating such markings,
from misleading purchasers as to the source of the goods.'. . . [W]hile Sears speaks in ab-
solutist terms, its conclusion that the States may place some conditions on the use of trade
dress indicates an implicit recognition that all state regulation of potentially patentable
but unpatented subject matter is not ipso facto pre-empted by the federal patent laws.").
McKenna is quite critical of the Court's new approach:
The contrast with Compco in particular could hardly be more striking. In
Compco, the Court expressly said that secondary meaning and nonfunctional-
ity, and even the possibility of confusion, 'may be relevant evidence in apply-
ing a State's law requiring such precautions as labeling,' but they were no ba-
sis 'for imposing liability for or prohibiting the actual acts of copying and
selling.' Bonito Boats pretends Sears and Compco had never drawn this dis-
tinction and claims that those cases stand for a principle that the Court spe-
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there is a concern about the creation of rights-whether federal
or state, and however labeled-for items that are, were, or might
be patentable, and the Court has continued, if only inconsistently,
to police the boundary in ways that make it clear that interfer-
ence with the patent realm is problematic and should be mini-
mized, if not completely avoided. Notably, trademark's functional-
ity doctrine and the patent preemption jurisprudence are both
explicitly concerned with the effort to preserve the patent realm
and some degree of free copying of useful items not subject to pa-
tent.
The legislative and judicial approach to copyright's useful arti-
cle doctrine does not reflect even the inconsistent attention to the
purposes and justifications for the channeling rules that trade-
mark and preemption doctrine receive. It is logical, however, that
if Congress and the courts have sought, however peripatetically,
to prevent the encroachment of trademark law and state unfair
competition law into patent's purview, similar incursions by copy-
right law would be likewise frowned upon. Based on the some-
what circumstantial evidence, it is not unreasonable to conclude
that the useful article doctrine is meant to serve a channeling
function, directing works away from the copyright realm, toward
the patent realm, or elsewhere, in order to bolster the patent bar-
gain that ensures that useful items either receive the protection
of a patent or may be freely copied. To the extent that this is true,
the useful article doctrine is really about patent law and the in-
teraction between patent law and other forms of protection, ra-
ther than about copyright law alone.
II. FAILING TO ACCOUNT FOR THE COPYRIGHT/PATENT BOUNDARY
Neither the current approaches to the useful article doctrine
nor the myriad proposals for reform of that doctrine address the
issue in a way that reflects the channeling function or the focus
on the larger intellectual property ecosystem. Instead, the tests
applied by the courts are varying, inconsistent, and ineffective at
policing the copyright/patent boundary. The proposals for reform
suffer from similar shortcomings.
cifically rejected.
McKenna, supra note 73, at 842 (footnote omitted) (quoting Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964)).
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Proposals for reform have proliferated; yet none has taken
hold. I suggest here that this is because these various approaches
share two distinguishing, and related, characteristics that render
them incapable of leading to a satisfactory approach. First, very
few take account of the policy reasons animating the useful arti-
cle doctrine. Second, though it may at first blush seem an odd ob-
servation, the vast majority of the proposals for reform are too
nuanced, too fact-dependent, and too careful." They are, in short,
overly focused on "getting it right" in terms of what ought to be
protected by copyright law. This narrow focus comes at the ex-
pense of the underlying policy rationale for the useful article doc-
trine.
A. The Case Law and Its Shortcomings
It is hardly novel to assert that the various tests for conceptual
separability are convoluted, complicated, and difficult to apply.
As Professor Paul Goldstein puts it, "[o]f the many fine lines that
run through the Copyright Act, none is more troublesome than
the line between protectible pictorial, graphic and sculptural
works and unprotectible utilitarian elements of useful articles.""
The legislative history obviously requires that courts "continue
their efforts to distinguish applied art and industrial design.""
The problem is that, as one court points out, "[t]he difficulty lies
not in the acceptance of that proposition [of conceptual separabil-
ity], which the statutory language clearly contemplates, but in its
application."" Conceptual separability is an inherently difficult
88. Nuanced, fact-dependent tests are, of course, not inherently problematic; they are
the exactly right approach in some situations. The rules versus standards literature
teaches that exact principle. For a brief summary of the literature (in the context of patent
law) and citations to the major works in the area, see Tun-Jen Chiang, The Rules and
Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 2010 Wis. L. REV. 1353, 1398-401 (2010). In the
case of the tests for "conceptual separability," the current standards exhibit many of the
problematic aspects of that approach. Being nuanced, fact-dependent, and often post-hoc,
the conceptual separability tests are generally unpredictable, costly, and, in some cases,
easily manipulable by the parties. These concerns, though significant, do not drive the so-
lution proposed here, however.
89. 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.5.3, at 2:67 (3d ed. 2005).
90. Denicola, supra note 16, at 730.
91. Pivot Point Int'l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 922-23 (7th Cir.
2004) ("It seems to be common ground between the parties and, indeed, among the courts
and commentators, that the protection of the copyright statute also can be secured when a
conceptual separability exists between the material sought to be copyrighted and the utili-
tarian design in which that material is incorporated.").
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enterprise, and the courts' struggle reflects that fact. In attempt-
ing to separate what are inseparable elements, courts have val-
iantly attempted to create tests that draw the appropriate line.
But they have, for the most part, failed, because they have ig-
nored or downplayed the policies animating the useful article doc-
trine in service of attempted accuracy. In other words, in trying to
come up with a test that will get each case "right," the courts
have ended up undermining the very purpose of the doctrine.
In Pivot Point International, Inc. v. Charlene Products, Inc., the
Seventh Circuit noted the variety of tests the courts have em-
ployed in making the conceptual separability determination." The
plethora of tests and formulations on their own indicate the prob-
lematic nature of the endeavor." The influential test proposed by
Professor Robert Denicola and adopted by the Second Circuit asks
whether the artistic design was influenced by functional or utili-
tarian factors." Another approach asks whether the artistic fea-
tures are primary and the utilitarian features secondary." If so,
the items may receive copyright protection." Another test asks
whether the item might be sold as art "because of its aesthetic
qualities."" A similar approach inquires as to whether the artistic
features might be able to "stand alone as a work of art tradition-
ally conceived."" William Patry suggests a test that simply asks
whether "artistic features are not utilitarian."" The Seventh Cir-
cuit in Pivot Point, after cataloging these various approaches, 00
92. Id. at 923.
93. The permutations of these tests, along with their advantages and shortcomings,
have been extensively detailed and discussed by others. See, e.g., infra notes 122-36 and
sources cited therein. It is not necessary to repeat that exercise here.
94. See Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir.
1987) (citing Denicola, supra note 16, at 741).
95. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980).
96. Id.
97. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[B][3], at
2-99 (2013).
98. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 89, at 2:75.
99. Pivot Point Int'l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 923 (7th Cir. 2004)
(citing 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 285 (1994)).
100. See Pivot Point, 372 F.3d at 922-30. In reviewing these approaches, the court not-
ed that "[almong the circuits, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has had occasion
to wrestle most comprehensively with the notion of 'conceptual separability.' Its case law
represents, we believe, an intellectual journey that has explored the key aspects of the
problem." Id. at 924.
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adopted something close to the Second Circuit's Denicola test-
what it calls the "process-oriented approach."10o
Although many of the tests discuss the clear congressional in-
tent to distinguish between copyrightable applied art and un-
copyrightable industrial design, they do not identify, much less
discuss or explain, the reasons for Congress' decision to draw this
line. In other words, the tests do not grapple with the policy rea-
sons motivating or justifying the useful article doctrine.
It is the failure to effectively address the policy questions that
drives the approach proposed below in Part III. While nearly all
the judicial opinions and all of the tests reference the legislative
intent of the 1976 Copyright Act, as stated in the statutory lan-
guage, to distinguish between works of applied art and items of
industrial design, there is very little reference to the reasons for
seeking to make this distinction. It seems beyond question that
understanding the possible justifications for a rule assists in de-
signing a test for implementing that rule. If, for example, the rea-
son for the rule is to ensure even-handed treatment under copy-
right law for all kinds of artistic endeavors, regardless of form,
medium, or style, such a policy principle might result in a test
that is intentionally over-inclusive. On the other hand, if the poli-
cy purpose animating the rule is to preserve an area in which pa-
tent law is the only possible form of protection, the test ought to
err in the other direction.
Even in the opinions that canvas the case law and discuss the
issues surrounding the conceptual separability tests and the use-
ful article doctrine in great detail, courts fail to refer to this un-
derlying (or overarching) question. In Pivot Point, for example,
the Seventh Circuit describes the statutory approach as asking
the courts to distinguish between applied art and industrial de-
sign by distinguishing between the aesthetic and the functional,
but the court does not indicate why it might be important to draw
this distinction. 102 Instead, the court merely states-in its twenty-
one page opinion-that "[a]lthough the Congressional goal was
101. Id. at 930 ("The Second Circuit cases exhibit a progressive attempt to forge a
workable judicial approach capable of giving meaning to the basic Congressional policy
decision to distinguish applied art from uncopyrightable industrial art or design.").
102. Id. at 920-21 ("It is common ground between the parties and, indeed, among the
courts that have examined the issue, that this language, added by the 1976 Act, was in-
tended to distinguish creative works that enjoy protection from elements of industrial de-
sign that do not.").
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evident, application of this language has presented the courts
with significant difficulty.""'o The Seventh Circuit accepts this as
the legislative mandate: Congress left to the courts the task of in-
terpreting and applying the general directive that useful articles
are not protectable.o' The Seventh Circuit ultimately adopts the
Second Circuit's process-oriented approach because it is "a pro-
gressive attempt to forge a workable judicial approach capable of
giving meaning to the basic Congressional policy decision to dis-
tinguish applied art from uncopyrightable industrial art or de-
sign."1os
The other courts that have addressed the problematic nature of
conceptual separability and its various and varying tests acknow-
ledge this purpose, which is obvious from the statutory language,
but they also fail to discuss the reasons that Congress might have
drawn this line in the first place. The Second Circuit in Brandir,
for example, begins its opinion by stating that "[i]n passing the
Copyright Act of 1976 Congress attempted to distinguish between
protectable 'works of applied art' and 'industrial designs not sub-
ject to copyright protection.""o The court does not, however, dis-
cuss the policy reasons that might justify or explain this rule. The
same is true of the other leading cases.1o7
The second shortcoming of various current judicial approaches
is that they are nuanced, fact-intensive, careful, and intent upon
ensuring that original expression receives copyright protection. It
may be odd to describe these characteristics as shortcomings, and
103. Id. at 921.
104. Id. ("In short, no doubt well-aware of the myriad of factual scenarios to which its
policy guidance would have to be applied, Congress wisely chose to provide only general
policy guidance to be implemented on a case-by-case basis through the Copyright Office
and the courts.").
105. Id. at 930-31.
106. Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1142-43 (2d Cir.
1987) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5667).
107. See, e.g., Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 414-18 (2d Cir.
1985) (discussing the legislative history and the case law and concluding that "Congress
has explicitly refused copyright protection for works of applied art or industrial design
which have aesthetic or artistic features that cannot be identified separately from the use-
ful article. Such works are not copyrightable regardless of the fact that they may be 'aes-
thetically satisfying and valuable') (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 55). The Carol
Barnhart court did not, however, mention the reasons for this congressional policy. The
same is true of Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc. In that case, the court started
the opinion by stating that the "case is on a razor's edge of copyright law," but did not dis-
cuss the reasons for the distinction. 632 F.2d 989, 990 (2d Cir. 1980).
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they certainly are not problematic in all contexts, but they are
counter-productive here.
In Brandir, for example, the court adopts a test in which copy-
rightability of the design is based on an inquiry about the design
process."o' As Professor Denicola stated, the question "should turn
on the relationship between the proffered work and the process of
industrial design."o' This means that in the case of the Ribbon
Rack, the court inquired into the designer's approach to creating
the bicycle rack."0 The lower court had found that the designer,
David Levine, had first created wire sculptures "each formed from
one continuous undulating piece of wire."" It was by happen-
stance that Levine thought of converting the wire sculptures into
bicycle racks, and he thereafter "adapted the original aesthetic
elements to accommodate and further a utilitarian purpose."112
From the reasoning in the case, it is clear that if Levine had hap-
pened to make a wire sculpture that accommodated bicycles, ra-
ther than modifying it later for that purpose, it would have been
protectable under the court's test. This is an odd result: the very
same design might be protectable if the design process had been
slightly different, or, even more troubling, if the designer's testi-
mony about the process had been different. In other words, the
Second Circuit approach is extremely fact-sensitive, and in a way
that is subject to manipulation by the parties. Such an approach
leads neither to consistency nor to a reliable adversarial process.
These same concerns emerge from the Seventh Circuit's "pro-
cess oriented" approach. The Seventh Circuit believes, perhaps
correctly, that this approach reconciles much of the case law, but
it remains focused on the particulars of the design process in each
case."' In discussing Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp.,
the Seventh Circuit makes clear that "it was the fact that the
creator of the torsos was driven by utilitarian concerns, such as
how display clothes would fit on the end product, that deprived
the human torsos of copyright protection.""' So the test relies on
post hoc testimony of interested parties to resolve the question of
108. 834 F.2d at 1145-46.
109. Denicola, supra note 16, at 741.
110. Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145-46.
111. Id. at 1146.
112. Id. at 1146-47.




how the design arose, and under no circumstances could the ques-
tion of protectability be resolved by looking at the design."' More-
over, two identical works might be treated differently depending
on the design process. That is a troubling result."'
Some of the other tests are problematic in the extent to which
they ask courts to make artistic judgments. For example, Judge
Newman in his dissent in Carol Barnhart, advocates what has
been called the "temporal displacement" test in which the court
would ask whether "the article . . . stimulate[s] in the mind of the
beholder a concept that is separate from the concept evoked by its
utilitarian function."' Similar approaches ask whether the pri-
mary use of the work is as a utilitarian article rather than as an
artistic work, or whether the aesthetic aspects are "primary," or
whether the work may be sold as "art.""' Each of these possibili-
ties was rejected by the Brandir and Pivot Point courts as overly
subjective, and rightly so."
Assuming that the goal of the useful article doctrine is to ex-
clude such works from copyright so that they are effectively
channeled away from copyright law, the nuanced rules articulat-
ed by many courts are not effective.'20 If, as in the trademark con-
text, the channeling function ought to trump other copyright con-
cerns, a bright-line rule that errs on the side of underprotection is
preferable. In discussing the functionality doctrine in trademark
115. The Pivot Point court describes the test as follows: "If the elements do reflect the
independent, artistic judgment of the designer, conceptual separability exists. Conversely,
when the design of a useful article is 'as much the result of utilitarian pressures as aes-
thetic choices,' the useful and aesthetic elements are not conceptually separable." Id. at
931 (citation omitted) (quoting Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1147).
116. Judge Kanne's dissent in Pivot Point expresses the same concern: "Moreover, the
'process-oriented approach,' advocated by the majority drifts even further away from the
statute. The statute looks to the useful article as it exists, not to how it was created." Id. at
934 (Kanne, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
117. Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 422 (2d Cir. 1985) (New-
man, J., dissenting); see also W. PATRY, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 44-45 (6th ed.
1986) (describing Judge Newman's test as the "temporal displacement" test).
118. Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1144 (2d Cir. 1987).
119. Pivot Point, 372 F.3d at 924; Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1144-45.
120. A nuanced standard may be problematic in other ways as well. With respect to
conceptual separability in particular, many of the tests are based on subjective or post hoc
evidence, making them quite easily manipulable by the parties. A number of the tests ap-
pear to be deeply subjective, even metaphysical as described by one commentator, requir-
ing the courts to make artistic judgments and engage in mental contortions impossible to
perform in a consistent fashion. See Lynch, supra note 15, at 647. These factors, among
others, mean that the current approaches are unpredictable, lead to inconsistent results,
and certainly do nothing to deter litigation.
2014]1 639
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
law, the Supreme Court made clear that certain items may well
otherwise qualify for trademark protection-they may serve as
identifiers of source and if copied may provoke consumer confu-
sion-but they may nonetheless be freely copied.12 ' Adapting this
reasoning and approach to copyright law involves a recognition
that "getting it right" from a copyright perspective interferes with
the channeling function of the useful article doctrine.
B. The Proposals for Reform and Their Shortcomings
The sheer number and variety of the tests for conceptual sepa-
rability indicate that the tests-and perhaps the enterprise it-
self-are problematic, and the number and variety of proposals
for reform confirm this. There is no dispute that the useful article
doctrine, and the notion of conceptual separability in particular,
have posed some of the most vexing issues in copyright law. Since
Professor Robert Denicola's article was published in 1983,122 and
notwithstanding the adoption by some courts of the test he pro-
posed,12 proposals for reform have continued unabated. It is im-
possible to do justice to the work that has been done in this area.
This article attempts to take a bird's eye view, and from this
perch, the proposals for reform demonstrate many of the same
characteristics as the tests applied by the courts. First, the pro-
posals generally do not take account of the over-arching motiva-
tion for the useful article doctrine. Second, the vast majority of
the proposals are focused on accuracy with respect to copyright
concerns, at the expense of other issues.
This discussion must begin with Professor Robert Denicola. In
1983, Denicola published an article canvassing the history of the
useful article doctrine and the case law addressing conceptual
separability following the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act.124
Denicola proposed a test for determining conceptual separability
that was developed in the Second Circuit"' and adopted in the
121. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164-65 (1995).
122. Denicola, supra note 16.
123. E.g., Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145.
124. Denicola, supra note 16, at 707.
125. Brandir, 834 F.2d 1142. The Second Circuit also suggested that "the differences
between the majority and the dissent in Carol Barnhart might have been resolved had
they had before them the Denicola article on Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Sug-
gested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles." Id. at 1145.
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Seventh Circuit as the "process-oriented" approach.126 Under Den-
icola's approach, the touchstone is determining "the extent to
which utilitarian considerations influence artistic expression."2 7
Based on a concern with drawing the line between applied art
and industrial design and implementing to the extent possible,
copyright's nondiscrimination principle, the process-oriented ap-
proach as proposed by Denicola offers a nuanced approach to im-
plementing these concerns.128 Professor Denicola concluded that
the determination was simply not amenable to bright lines or
easy resolution:
When copyright in "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" ven-
tures beyond the narrow confines of the "fine arts," the slope be-
comes slippery indeed. Current law expressly preserves exclusive
rights in works of art applied to utilitarian ends, yet wisely endeav-
ors to exclude the general design of commercial products. The dis-
tinction between copyrightable "applied art" and uncopyrightable
"industrial design" has generally been pursued through mechanical
models offering the seductive security of unbending rules and osten-
sibly objective criteria. The arbitrary divisions inevitably engendered
by traditional analysis, however, can only crudely approximate the
distinctions pursued in the revision effort.
The Copyright Act of 1976 invites a more discriminating analysis.
The standard of separate identity and independent existence encour-
ages a thoughtful appraisal of the character of the claimant's contri-
bution. The exclusion of industrial design from the scope of copyright
is best understood as an attempt to bar forms influenced in signifi-
cant measure by utilitarian concerns. Thus, copyright is reserved to
product features and shapes that reflect even in their utilitarian en-
vironment the unconstrained aesthetic perspective of the artist.
Nothing short of a candid assessment of the nature of the proffered
work can successfully implement the prudent, yet fragile, distinction
between applied art and industrial design.129
Much of this is unassailable, or at the very least quite convinc-
ing. But it has not prevented the courts from, seemingly endless-
126. Pivot Point Int'l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 930 (7th Cir. 2004)
("This process-oriented approach for conceptual separability-focusing on the process of
creating the object to determine whether it is entitled to copyright protection-is more ful-
ly articulated in Brandir and indeed reconciles the earlier case law pertaining to concep-
tual separability.").
127. Denicola, supra note 16, at 743.
128. Id. ("A model emphasizing the influence of utilitarian factors frees the judicial
analysis from its unfortunate fixation on appearance alone. If the ultimate aim is to dis-
tinguish applied art from industrial design, theories focusing only on appearances cannot
achieve the desired end. It is the process more than the result that gives industrial design
its distinctive character.").
129. Id. at 747-48.
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ly, addressing the exact nature of conceptual separability doctrine
and how it might be implemented in the case law.' Neither has
it stemmed the tide of critiques or new proposals for reform.
As described above in Part II.A, the Denicola approach, or some
variation of it, has taken hold in a number of circuits."' Professor
Denicola powerfully argued that, as of 1983, "[t]he attempts of the
Congress, the Copyright Office, and the courts to delimit the
boundaries of copyright in useful articles have been only partially
successful."'32 Unfortunately, notwithstanding Professor Denico-
la's efforts, this remains the case. Since Professor Denicola pub-
lished his influential article, the number and types of tests for
conceptual separability have proliferated,'" and the critiques of
the courts' doctrines have continued. Like Professor Denicola,
many commentators are focused, to be blunt, on "getting it right."
That is, a priority for many is setting forth an approach that en-
sures that all copyrightable works or aspects of a work receive
copyright protection, or that non-representational art, for exam-
ple, is treated fairly. These are admirable goals, of course, but
ones with serious downsides. This article suggests that "getting it
right" in this context may be less important than other considera-
tions.
Another set of proposals is based on the notion that copyright
law is under-protective of industrial design or that it discrimi-
nates against certain kinds or forms of artwork. This is, in es-
sence, another version of the accuracy critique, asserting general-
ly that industrial design is under-protected. These proposals take
different forms, with many suggesting sui generis regimes of pro-
tection for industrial design and others proposing that the copy-
right standards for protection of industrial design be more capa-
cious in some ways.'34 For example, Professor Orit Fischman Afori
has proposed a specialized form of design protection, while ac-
knowledging that others have done so as well.' These proposals
130. See supra Part II.A.
131. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
132. Denicola, supra note 16, at 709.
133. See supra Part II.A.
134. See Reichman, Design After 1976, supra note 30, at 383; Reichman, Past and Cur-
rent Trends, supra note 30, at 397-98.
135. Orit Fischman Afori, Reconceptualizing Property in Designs, 25 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 1105, 1108-09 (2008) ("Designs should enjoy a specially accorded law-a sui gen-
eris law-that has some important deviations from the copyright scheme. The idea of en-
acting a sui generis copyright law for design is not new. However, there is still a need to
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are generally based on the idea that design is under-protected in
the United States system and internationally."' Afori, for exam-
ple, describes her approach:
I set down the doctrinal basis for my principal analysis by describing
the triple protection designs enjoy in the U.S., through all three ma-
jor intellectual property disciplines: copyright, patent and trade-
mark. A closer inspection reveals that designs enjoy very limited
protection by means of these three disciplines, since they do not fit
exactly within each realm. The outcome is inappropriate and inade-
quate protection for designs.
Many of these proposals may be correct as a principled matter:
industrial design clearly does not fit perfectly into our existing in-
tellectual property regimes,8 ' and it is an empirical question
whether industrial designers might be in need of a greater incen-
tive for the creation of their products.13' Indeed, there is much ev-
idence in the legislative history and elsewhere that Congress in-
tended to leave industrial design out of the Copyright Act because
it did not quite fit the copyright paradigm, 40 and there was an
accurately define the subject matter of this specially tailored law, and to sketch the mech-
anism for its separation from copyright law.").
136. See, e.g., Richard G. Frenkel, Comment, Intellectual Property in the Balance: Pro-
posals for Improving Industrial Design Protection in the Post-TRIPs Era, 32 LoY. L.A. L.
REV. 531, 536 (1999) (concluding that "whether Congress chooses to borrow from the ar-
chitectural copyright standards or create a fourth area of design protection, society will
benefit from increased industrial design protection"); Regan E. Keebaugh, Note, Intellec-
tual Property and the Protection of Industrial Design: Are Sui Generis Protection Measures
the Answer to Vocal Opponents and a Reluctant Congress?, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L, 255, 277
(2005) ("[T]he advantages of sui generis protection of industrial design include (1) allowing
Congress to design legislation to serve the specific needs of individual industries and (2)
giving Congress the ability to pass design protection legislation with limited scope and ef-
fect, thereby allowing Congress to strengthen protection for industries that support
stronger protection and avoid opposition from industries that do not."); Kimberly Allen
Richards, Comment, Should Furniture Become Fashion-Forward? Applying Fashion's
Copyright Proposals to the Furniture Industry, 11 WAKE FOREST J. Bus. & INTELL. PROP.
L. 269, 293 (2010) (arguing that the fashion industry's proposed legislation "could be
adapted to the furniture industry to help close the industry's gap in intellectual property
protection and preserve the incentive for the furniture industry to invest in creating origi-
nal designs").
137. Afori, supra note 135, at 1108.
138. See, e.g., Orit Fischman Afori, The Role of the Non-Functionality Requirement in
Design Law, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 847, 849 (2010) ("The aim of
industrial design law, however, is not to encourage the development of new technologies,
but rather to encourage the development of their external appearance.").
139. This is a point on which this article remains decidedly agnostic.
140. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5668.
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expectation that a separate form of protection would be created. 4 1
Needless to say, this has not yet occurred.142
If, in fact, industrial design is in need of some additional pro-
tection, a sui generis regime may be the right way to go. The
available legislative history (indicating that Congress anticipat-
ed passing design legislation after 1976 and that Congress be-
lieved that copyright was not the appropriate home for design
protection) counsels against tinkering with copyright doctrine to
allow it to protect industrial design."'
This, however, is just what another set of the proposals sug-
gests. Rather than advocating for a separate system of protection
for design, many commentators have followed the path blazed by
Denicola, suggesting revisions designed to improve the doctrine.'4 4
Many of these proposals are animated by concerns that the cur-
rent approaches discriminate against certain kinds of art-non-
representational art, for example-or, as with the proposals for
sui generis protection, that the current law is simply insufficient-
ly protective of industrial design.
In assessing the problematic nature of many of the tests, Pro-
fessor Keith Aoki was blunt:
This Article identifies distinctions used in copyright law that purport
to be useful in resolving cases, but which, in fact, have resulted in
141. For a comprehensive review of the pre-1976 Act and the legislative history leading
up to the 1976 Act, see Keith Aoki, Contradiction and Context in American Copyright Law,
9 CARDozo ARTs & ENT. L.J. 303, 314-34 (1991).
142. In addition to the question of whether industrial design is in need of a bulked up
set of rights, a question on which this article remains agnostic, the hurdles in the way of a
new, specialized regime are substantial. There are at least two major barriers: (1) the the-
oretical work of designing a new system; and (2) the practical hurdle of enacting a new
regime.
143. See Aoki, supra note 141, at 324-25; Denicola, supra note 16, at 719-20 (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 50); see also Samson Vermont, The Dubious Legal Rationale for
Denying Copyright to Fashion, 21 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 89 (2013). Professor Vermont
critiques the notion that fashion designs are "useful articles" and thus excluded from copy-
right protection. Id. at 90 (footnote omitted) ("The official rationale for denying copyright
to clothing, that a garment is a 'useful article' whose aesthetic features are inseparable
from its utilitarian function, is unsound and thus may give way in time . . . ."). Professor
Vermont argues that opponents of the proposed sui generis fashion design protection legis-
lation should reconsider that "if the bill fails ... the courts may eventually hold that fanci-
ful clothing is protectable under regular copyright." Id. On the other hand, "[i]f the bill
passes, the sui generis protection would likely preempt regular copyright, partly as a mat-
ter of statutory construction and partly because sui generis protection would eliminate an
otherwise compelling policy reason for protecting clothing under regular copyright." Id.
144. See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for Princi-
pled Standards, 70 1INN. L. REV. 579, 607-09 (1985).
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confusing, inconsistent, and erratic decisions. Faced with these con-
tradictions, the courts, on the alleged mandate of Congress, have un-
successfully sought to suppress the internal instability of their vary-
ing positions through the use of the doctrine of "conceptual
separability." 4 5
In the article, Aoki engages in a detailed review of the relevant
law and legislative history.' 6 Aoki did not provide a concrete pro-
posal for reform but demonstrated clearly how the nondiscrimina-
tion principle-the notion that judges should not be making artis-
tic judgments-is fraught with difficulty and nearly impossible to
implement.147 According to Aoki, this is particularly true with re-
spect to industrial design protection. He states that "Holmes' ad-
monition in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. regarding
aesthetic judicial restraint is invoked at such a high level of gen-
erality, that it becomes pathologically indeterminate, capable of
providing potentially broad protection, or complete denial of pro-
tection, to industrial design."4 4 Aoki's critique is really just that, a
critique rather than a proposal for reform, but the issues he dis-
cussed in his 1991 article abound in the stream of proposals
based on similar criticisms.
When these criticisms, revolving around a concern about un-
der-protection generally and under-protection of "art" in particu-
lar, lead to concrete proposals, they tend to be even more nuanced
and fact-dependent than the tests currently employed by the
courts. In other words, they are aimed at getting the protectabil-
ity questions-Is this original expression? Is it art? Is it aesthet-
ic?-just right in every case."' Others are concerned with discrim-
145. Aoki, supra note 141, at 303-04 (footnotes omitted); see id. at 304-05 (alteration in
original) ("Joseph Story wrote that copyright law approaches 'what may be called the met-
aphysics of the law, where the distinctions are, or at least may be, very subtile [sic] and
refined, and sometimes, almost evanescent.' There is no area of copyright where this is
more true than the area of conceptual separability.").
146. See id. at 323-25.
147. Id. at 383-84 ("Many of the courts which have grappled with the question of con-
ferring intellectual property rights on the products of the industrial design process have
focused on the aesthetic/utilitarian qualities of the object itself, producing an increasingly
unintelligible body of law that focuses on the issue of 'conceptual separability.' Courts
have clung to incoherent distinctions which have grown increasingly abstract with each
new case, religiously invoking the phrase 'form follows function."').
148. Id. at 382 (footnotes omitted).
149. Thomas M. Byron, As Long as There's Another Way: Pivot Point v. Charlene Prod-
ucts as an Accidental Template for a Creativity-Driven Useful Article Analysis, 49 IDEA
147, 191-93 (2009) (proposing a "creativity" test that incorporates the idea/expression di-
chotomy, the merger doctrine, and the scenes a faire doctrine into the conceptual separa-
bility analysis); Stephen Langs, The Definitional Scope of an Intrinsic Utilitarian Function
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ination against various forms of art, and these also can be charac-
terized as "getting it right" kinds of approaches.' As with the
Under the 1976 Copyright Act: One Man's Use Is Another Man's Art, 20 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 143, 172 (1998) ("Determining whether a particular use qualifies as an intrinsic utili-
tarian function should be done on an ad hoc basis under a 'primary functional significance'
analysis by considering the relevant factors discussed in Brandir and Poe."); Mark A. Lo-
Bello, The Dichotomy Between Artistic Expression and Industrial Design: To Protect or Not
to Protect, 13 WHITTIER L. REV. 107, 135 (1992) (proposing a "gradated" system in which
"[r]ather than providing for uniform protection and its problematic inclusion or exclusion
of broad categories of applied art and industrial design, a gradated scheme would provide
some level of protection to all works"); Shira Perlmutter, Conceptual Separability and
Copyright in the Designs of Useful Articles, 37 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 339, 381 (1989)
("Given the nature of the problem, there can be no easy, predictable solution to the issue of
copyright in useful articles. As in so many other areas of copyright law, each case poses
unique facts that strain against abstract formulations, no matter how well conceived or
articulated. Nevertheless, greater clarity is both possible and desirable. The proposed 'du-
ality' test, applied in the framework of all the appropriate steps of copyright analysis,
should minimize the confusion in this area and lead to more consistent results."); Gayle
Coleman, Comment, The Protection of Useful Articles and the Elusive Concept of Concep-
tual Separability: Brandir International Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 13 NOVA L.
REV. 1417, 1441-44 (1989) (recommending the retention of the conceptual separability re-
quirement and the adoption of a four-part test combining the inquiries from a number of
cases); Sally M. Donahue, Comment, The Copyrightability of Useful Articles: The Second
Circuit's Resistance to Conceptual Separability, 6 TOURo L. REV. 327, 356-57 (1990) (pro-
posing an amalgam of the Kieselstein-Cord test and the approach suggested by the dissent
in Carol Barnhart: "Conceptual separability is found when the design features of a utili-
tarian article trigger in the mind of the ordinary responsible observer a concept separate
from that evoked by its utilitarian function."); Raymond M. Polakovic, Comment, Should
the Bauhaus Be in the Copyright Doghouse?: Rethinking Conceptual Separability, 64 U.
COLO. L. REV. 871, 901 (1993) ("A more uniform approach, in which a useful article is
treated essentially the same as a literary or artistic work, would assuage the current un-
derprotection of useful articles without inappropriately removing from the public domain
the underlying ideas embodied in the useful article.").
150. See, e.g., Darren Hudson Hick, Conceptual Problems of Conceptual Separability
and the Non-Usefulness of the Useful Articles Distinction, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SoC'Y U.S.A.
37, 56-57 (2010) (footnotes omitted) ('There are, I suggest, two sufficiency tests for con-
ceptual separability, a positive result for either of which is sufficient to warrant a finding
of separability. First, if one can conceive of the item's aesthetic elements (that is, its de-
sign), without at the same time conceiving of its utilitarian aspects (that is, its function),
then these elements are conceptually separable. Conversely, if one can conceive of the
item's function without at the same time conceiving of its particular design, then its func-
tion and its design are likewise conceptually separable. Given this, I suspect it will almost
always be possible to conceptually separate a work's function from its design, for it seems
that while function often restricts design, it almost never dictates design. And so, it seems,
virtually all useful articles will be in part potentially copyrightable. So, we might ask,
what are the implications of this understanding of useful articles and conceptual separa-
bility? The first apparent implication is that, so far as copyright is concerned, any strong
de facto distinction between, say, a sculpture and a blender, melts away. Many, I have no
doubt, will rail against this result. But insofar as American copyright law is designed to
protect 'authored works,' the 'artwork' label carries little weight. There are, after all, many
artworks--indeed, many great artworks-that are disqualified from copyright protection,
and many non-artworks that we want protected, even outside the realm of useful ob-
jects."); Matthew C. Broaddus, Comment, Designers Should Strive to Create "Useless"
Products: Using the "Useful Article" Doctrine to Avoid Separability Analysis, 51 S. TEX. L.
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Denicola approach, these critiques are in some ways unassailable.
It is clearly the case that none of the current proposals are capa-
ble of perfectly drawing the line between applied art and indus-
trial design, between the copyrightable and the noncopyrightable.
This article advocates simply abandoning the quest to find and
articulate the perfect line."' First, the line is so difficult to draw
that the undertaking is simply not worth the effort. Second, it is
far better to attempt to draw a brightline that is responsive to the
policy considerations underlying the useful article doctrine.
While many of the criticisms of the useful article doctrine ju-
risprudence focus on the industrial design/applied art distinction,
very few explore the reasons for this distinction. It is clear that
Congress intended that industrial design not be protected by
copyright law, but Congress did not explain why this was so. As
discussed above in Part I, it appears that there was an expecta-
tion that a separate form of protection would be passed. It also
seems that one justification-if not a motivating factor for Con-
gress-for excluding useful articles from the copyright realm is to
channel works out of copyright and either to the patent realm or
the public domain (or, perhaps, a sui generis design protection
scheme). But few of the proposals and even fewer of the cases dis-
cuss the channeling function of the useful article doctrine.15
REV. 493, 494 (2009) ("This Comment will show how proper application of the statutory
definition of 'useful article' could save courts time and trouble and offer increased protec-
tion to designers by allowing them to avoid the difficult, confusing, and dangerous pitfalls
of separability analysis."); Barton R. Keyes, Note, Alive and Well: The (Still) Ongoing De-
bate Surrounding Conceptual Separability in American Copyright Law, 69 OHIO ST. L.J.
109, 112 (2008) (suggesting a test that turns "only [on] the subjective and objective ele-
ments of the design process" in part because "[tihis limited focus ensures that inquiry is
not influenced by judges' or mainstream consumers' biases about the nature of art").
151. Afori has taken this approach, to some extent. In a 2010 article, she discusses the
difficulties in applying a nonfunctionality rule and proposes that the question of function-
ality simply be addressed only in the context of an infringement claim on a case-by-case
basis and not at the registration stage:
Generally speaking, this kind of solution is common in intellectual property
law and particularly in copyright law. The most problematic questions in
copyright law, such as eligibility, scope of rights, exceptions, and limitations,
where clear and certain rules are impossible to formulate, are resolved by ap-
plying an open standard on a case-by-case basis in the courts. This pragmatic
approach should be used in the industrial design realm as well. The non-
functionality requirement could therefore function as an open standard to be
applied on a case-by-case basis.
Afori, supra note 138, at 871-72.
152. Indeed, they do not generally discuss any reasons for this distinction, appearing to
take it as sufficient on its own. See supra Part II.A.
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Many of these commentators are very careful and thoughtful
about where and how to draw the line between industrial design
and applied art, but very few of them even mention, much less
discuss, why it is important to draw such a line.
There are a few exceptions, of course. Orit Fischman Afori, for
example, acknowledges that the "underlying rationale [of the non-
functionality requirement] involves the desire to avoid undermin-
ing patent law provisions, which under certain strict conditions
provide protection of functional elements.""' This does not drive
her proposals, however. Rather, as with virtually all of the pro-
posals for reform, Afori's is focused on copyright law or, more spe-
cifically, protection for industrial designs."
A few scholars have put forth ideas animated by the broader
policy questions. In 1991, Michael Lynch proposed a rule based
primarily on physical separability"' and justified this approach
with reference to the purpose behind the useful article doctrine,
which he described as "restrict[ing] copyright to those aspects of a
useful article in which a monopoly can be awarded without neces-
sarily extending to the utilitarian features of the article.""' Lynch
observed that the focus on the meaning and definition of "art" led
to nearly intractable problems: "Lawyers and judges with an ex-
aggerated respect for artists then found themselves with no relia-
ble way of distinguishing a work of art from a parking lot light
fixture.""' Lynch notes that the policy driving the useful article
doctrine is not made clear in the statute or the congressional his-
tory,"' but he concludes that there are reasons to believe that "a
free market is more important in useful articles than in art and
literature.""' Lynch does not discuss the channeling function of
the useful article doctrine explicitly, but he suggests that the
153. Afori, supra note 138, at 873.
154. Id. at 873-74.
155. Lynch, supra note 15, at 647. ("This article will first demonstrate a crude, literal
and physical approach which might have produced far more clarity, and results no less
desirable.").
156. Id.
157. Id. at 650.
158. Id. at 655 ("The reasons why Congress has chosen to grant copyright protection to
three-dimensional works of art, but not to three-dimensional works of utility, are not stat-
ed explicitly.").
159. Id. at 656.
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"pro-art rationale" of copyright protection has obscured concerns
about monopolizing functional designs. 6 o
More recently, Sepehr Shahshahani addressed the policy ques-
tion head on, claiming that "the numerous approaches to the de-
sign of useful article exclusion and its central problem of separa-
bility, though varied, share a fatal common trait: They fail to
examine and serve the policy rationale of the doctrine."
Shahshahani argues that the reason for excluding useful articles
from copyright protection is to prevent copyright law from pro-
tecting ideas."' Shahshahani acknowledges that this is related to
patent protection but does not explain why copyright ought not
protect something that may be protected by patent,6 ' except to
say that "the raison d'6tre of the design of useful article exclusion
is to guard the boundary between patent and copyright." 64
Shahshahani's proposed solution is to treat the useful article doc-
trine just as the merger doctrine is treated.'6 ' The problem is that
this test is no different in the end than the myriad other tests for
"conceptual separability."'66 To ask whether an article can be pro-
duced without the design elements sought to be protected is only
to ask whether those elements are separable in some way. Thus
this proposal retains the nuance that is so problematic in the cur-
rent approaches.
160. Id. at 658.
161. Sepehr Shahshahani, The Design of Useful Article Exclusion: A Way Out of the
Mess, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOc'Y U.S.A. 859, 859-60 (2010).
162. Id. at 860; see also id. at 876 ("It is the central contention of this article that the
only sensible policy rationale for the design of a useful article exclusion is the same as the
policy rationale served by the merger doctrine.").
163. Id. at 860 ("The only sensible policy rationale of the DUA [design of a useful arti-
cle] exclusion is to address this particularly acute merger problem by policing the border
between patent and copyright and channeling the protection of functional ideas from copy-
right to patent.").
164. Id. at 876.
165. Id. at 860, 876; see generally Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble, 379 F.2d 675, 678-79
(1st Cir. 1967) (explaining the merger doctrine and applying it to rules for a sweepstakes);
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930) (applying the merger
doctrine to aspects of a play).
166. Shahshahani proposes that:
[Tmhe design of a useful article should not be copyrightable if the article can-
not be efficiently produced in a way that would enable it to function effective-
ly absent the design sought to be copyrighted. This will occur if the design for
which copyright is sought is the only design or one of few designs that allow
the article to function effectively and be mass produced.
Id. at 876.
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While a few of the proposals address some of the policy con-
cerns, none of them suggests an approach that clearly advances
those policy concerns. Instead, many of the proposals remain
stubbornly copyright focused, which leads, as we have seen, to
nuanced, careful rules that do not just create uncertainty and in-
consistency but fail to serve the channeling purpose intended by
the useful article doctrine.
III. TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE COPYRIGHT/PATENT BOUNDARY
The sheer number of tests applied by the courts and proposals
suggested by scholars for the reform of copyright's useful article
doctrine is overwhelming. They vary in their baseline assump-
tions, they differ in their policy preferences, and they offer many
quite different formulations. Nonetheless, they share some signif-
icant characteristics. First, they fail to address, either implicitly
or explicitly, the policy purpose that animates the useful article
doctrine. Broadly speaking, the useful article doctrine is not just
about copyright law but is about the interaction between copy-
right law and other forms of protections for creative and inventive
works. Second, perhaps because the approaches are so focused on
copyright law alone, they seek accuracy at the expense of these
policy concerns. This means that the tests tend to be nuanced,
fact-based, and post hoc; this also means that they are unpredict-
able, sometimes inconsistent, and difficult to apply.
A bright-line rule that more effectively channels works away
from copyright law is not just responsive to the policy goals of the
useful article doctrine, it also provides a more consistent ap-
proach that ought to reduce the uncertainty endemic to the cur-
rent doctrine. Taking as a starting point that the useful article
doctrine is meant to channel works away from copyright law-
toward patent law, or the public domain, or perhaps to a sui gen-
eris regime-this new approach looks to other channeling doc-
trines for guidance, trademark's functionality doctrine in particu-
lar. The channeling function, moreover, is best served by a bright-
line rule, which should also provide a greater degree of predicta-
bility and consistency.
Borrowing from trademark law is one possibility. Trademark
law employs the "functionality doctrine" to preclude protection for
functional items regardless of their trademarkability in other re-
spects, thus channeling works away from trademark that belong
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elsewhere in the intellectual property universe. Copyright law
should adopt a similar default rule in which "useful" works are
presumptively not protected. Shifting the burden of proof would
change the default to one of non-protectability. The burden could
only be overcome by a showing on the part of the copyright pro-
ponent that the item sought to be protected is not, in fact, useful.
This section describes how this burden-shifting rule would oper-
ate and then sets forth two possibilities for the elements to be
shown by the plaintiff in order to overcome the burden.
A. The "Not Copyright" Default for Useful Articles
The useful article doctrine is intended, by its very terms, to ex-
clude useful articles from the realm of copyright law. Less explicit
is the channeling function served by the doctrine: useful articles
are to be excluded from copyright law because such items are to
be protected by patent law, or fall into the public domain. Be-
cause of the strictures of patent law, if potentially patentable
items might receive copyright protection instead of or in addition
to patent protection, many designers might select copyright law,
and the useful designs will be protected for seventy years or
more, rather than falling into the public domain and being
available for copying after the twenty-year patent term.16 For this
reason, copyright law must take account of patent law and policy.
In order to ensure that potentially patentable items-useful
items-do not receive copyright protection, the courts should
adopt a bright-line rule that errs on the side of under-protection.
Such a rule will keep useful items out of copyright and deter de-
signers from pursuing copyright protection or litigation in the
close cases. As described in Part II above, the courts and scholars
have generally not acknowledged this channeling function or
grappled with the useful article doctrine's place in the broader in-
tellectual property regime.
In contrast, trademark law's channeling doctrine, the function-
ality rule, has been articulated more explicitly as a doctrine that
excludes items from the trademark realm in order to advance pa-
tent law policy."' It is clear that the functionality doctrine is at
167. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012).
168. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
169. E.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995).
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least as much about patent law and the broader IP regime as it is
about trademark law. As a result, the doctrine has been formu-
lated and applied differently than copyright's useful article doc-
trine.
1. Trademark's Functionality Doctrine
The Lanham Act provides that trade dress may be protectable,
but the proponent must prove that the elements sought to be pro-
tected are not functional.' "This burden of proof gives force to
the well-established rule that trade dress protection may not be
claimed for product features that are functional.""' Thus, there is
a statutory commandment that functional items are excluded
from the trademark realm. The Lanham Act emphasizes this ex-
clusion from trademark with a burden-shifting rule that creates a
default of "not trademark" for utilitarian items.'72
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the functionality doc-
trine in trademark law serves a channeling purpose, directing
useful inventions to the patent realm and prohibiting trademark
protection for such items.
The functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to
promote competition by protecting a firm's reputation, from instead
inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to control a
useful product feature. It is the province of patent law, not trade-
mark law, to encourage invention by granting inventors a monopoly
over new product designs or functions for a limited time, after which
competitors are free to use the innovation. If a product's functional
features could be used as trademarks, however, a monopoly over
such features could be obtained without regard to whether they qual-
ify as patents and could be extended forever (because trademarks
may be renewed in perpetuity).
The functionality doctrine in trademark law is explicitly designed
to direct functional, or useful, items to the patent realm; they
simply may not be protected by trademark law. Placing the bur-
170. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (2012) ("In a civil action for trade dress infringement under
this chapter for trade dress not registered on the principal register, the person who asserts
trade dress protection has the burden of proving that the matter sought to be protected is
not functional.").
171. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001).
172. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). This is so if the trade dress proponent seeks to register the
mark or decides to bring a suit for infringement of an unregistered mark.
173. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164-65 (citations omitted).
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den of proof on the proponent of protection makes clear that the
default is one of no protection; close cases fall clearly on the side
of no protection.
In TrafFix v. MDI, the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split
concerning the details and application of trademark's functionali-
ty doctrine. 17 4 TrafFix was a trade dress dispute revolving around
the design of traffic signs. TrafFix Devices copied MDI's design
after the patents on the design expired. TrafFix's actions there-
fore did not constitute patent infringement, but MDI sued for,
among other things, trade dress infringement."'
Emphasizing the "not trademark" default rule of the function-
ality doctrine, the Supreme Court disposed of MDI's arguments
easily.' The burden placed on the proponent, along with the ex-
istence of the expired utility patent, made it very difficult for MDI
to prevail.'" As the Court explained, "MDI did not, and cannot,
carry the burden of overcoming the strong evidentiary inference
of functionality based on the disclosure of the dual-spring design
in the claims of the expired patents.""' While relying on the exist-
ence of the expired patents, the Supreme Court also made it very
clear that the burden rests on the party seeking trademark pro-
tection in all instances and that MDI would have failed to meet
that burden even in the absence of an expired patent."'
2. "Functionality" for Copyright Law
The Copyright Act does not contain a provision similar to that
in the Lanham Act, but the statute clearly indicates that useful
articles will not receive copyright protection and that even the
aesthetic-that is, non-useful-aspects of those articles will not
174. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 28 (describing the circuit split as involving the question of
"whether the existence of an expired utility patent forecloses the possibility of the patent-
ee's claiming trade dress protection in the product's design").
175. Id. at 26.
176. Id. at 29-30.
177. Id. ("If trade dress protection is sought for those features the strong evidence of
functionality based on the previous patent adds great weight to the statutory presumption
that features are deemed functional until proved otherwise by the party seeking trade
dress protection.").
178. Id. at 30.
179. Id. at 32 ("[Elven if there has been no previous utility patent the party asserting
trade dress has the burden to establish the nonfunctionality of alleged trade dress fea-
tures. MDI could not meet this burden.").
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be protected unless they can be identified separately."'o While this
is not explicit burden-shifting language, it does appear to require
that the copyright proponent identify those non-useful aspects of
a work in order to receive copyright protection.
Consistent with the trademark approach, courts in copyright
cases should make explicit that they treat this language as creat-
ing a default in favor of non-protection and requiring proof oth-
erwise to overcome the presumption."' The copyright plaintiff
should bear this burden despite having already obtained a certifi-
cate of registration from the Copyright Office.182
There are differences between trademark and copyright law
that must be addressed in considering whether trademark's func-
tionality doctrine could be adopted in copyright cases. First, a
trademark owner may sue on an unregistered trademark or trade
dress, but a copyright owner must first register before commenc-
ing a lawsuit.' Second, the registration process in the Copyright
Office is not particularly robust. The Copyright Office does not
spend a great deal of its time or resources examining copyright
registrations.'84 The Patent & Trademark Office ("USPTO"), on
the other hand, does a somewhat more searching examination of
trademark applications and a relatively rigorous review of patent
applications."' In other words, the requirement that the copyright
plaintiff have obtained registration is quite a minor hurdle. One
conclusion to be drawn from this is that the Copyright Office is
180. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). The definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works"
provides that the design of a useful article "shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of
existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article." Id.
181. Alternatively, Congress could amend the Copyright Act to make this default clear.
This is less likely to occur than judicial interpretation to the same end, however.
182. Id. § 411(a) ("[N]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United
States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim
has been made in accordance with this title").
183. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (2012) (allowing for lawsuits based on unregis-
tered trademark or trade dress), with 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (requiring registration for suit to
lie).
184. See, e.g., Thomas G. Field, Jr., Judicial Review of Copyright Examination, 44
IDEA 479, 484 (2004) (footnote omitted) (noting that "examination is permitted, and appli-
cations to register are sometimes refused; historically, however, few works have received
attention beyond the formalities").
185. See Bruce Day & Mike Martinez, The Roots of Intellectual Property: Trade Secrets,
Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights, 62 J. KAN. B.A. 30, 33 (1993) (detailing the rigorous
nature of patent review).
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unlikely to vigorously screen out industrial designs that ought
not be protected by copyright law. Under both trademark and
copyright law, however, registration is prima facie evidence of va-
lidity.86 While the USPTO is given substantial deference in its
determinations, it would be justifiable to refuse to give the Copy-
right Office the same level of deference.
Keeping this in mind, in cases in which the defendant raises
the useful article doctrine as a defense, the courts ought to re-
quire the plaintiff to prove that the work is not useful. Under the
assumption that neither the copyright proponent nor the Copy-
right Office has expended resources on this question at the regis-
tration stage, it is reasonable to require the showing in the trial
court.18 ' Applying this simple presumption might, by itself, re-
solve a vast number of the difficult cases, at least to the extent
that it would deter litigation and perhaps even some copyright
registrations. This burden-shifting would create a new default
rule, and on their own, default rules can make a big difference in
behavior."' Moreover, this particular default rule flows clearly
from and reflects the policy purpose of ensuring that useful arti-
cles are excluded from copyright protection, and it acknowledges
that it is better to err on the side of under-protection in order to
achieve this goal.
B. The Copyright Proponent's Burden
Placing the burden explicitly on the copyright proponent and
requiring clear evidence that the items sought to be protected are
not useful is the most significant part of this proposal. There are
a variety of possibilities regarding the details of what the copy-
right proponent must demonstrate in order to overcome the pre-
sumption and obtain copyright protection. This section describes
two alternatives and explains how they would apply in several of
the leading cases.
186. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (2012); 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2012).
187. This certainly makes more sense and is more efficient than trying to change the
Copyright Office procedure. To require the showing by copyright proponents at the regis-
tration stage would impose a great deal of cost on the office and on copyright owners.
Much of that would likely be unnecessary expense as, presumably, many of the copyright
owners will never bring suit on their works.
188. For a general discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation,
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349 (2011).
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1. Physical Separability
One possibility that is quite responsive to both the policy con-
cerns and to predictability and consistency concerns is to provide
that in the case of a useful article, the copyright owner may only
get protection for the aesthetic elements of a work if those ele-
ments are physically separable from the useful elements."' To be
absolutely clear, under this approach, the courts would simply
abandon their efforts to define and determine "conceptual sepa-
rability." This is indeed a broad-brush approach: some original,
expressive works that would in every other respect qualify for
copyright protection would surely be excluded from the copyright
realm. On the other hand, this approach would virtually guaran-
tee that no useful works would receive copyright protection and it
is likely to provide a sufficiently clear rule such that industrial
designers would be disinclined to seek copyright protection for
works that exist at the boundary of copyright law.
A bright-line rule that protects only physically-separable aes-
thetic elements of useful articles takes seriously the notion that
useful articles should not be protected by copyright law but be-
long instead in the patent realm. Under this approach, useful or
functional elements of useful articles are extremely unlikely to
receive copyright protection. Indeed, the rule errs the other way,
likely excluding from copyright protection expressive elements of
works that are not functional. If the channeling function of the
useful article doctrine is considered paramount, then the overpro-
tective effect of the bright-line rule is appropriate."' This rule is
also easy to apply, provides relatively predictable results, and re-
duces the necessity of courts making artistic or aesthetic judg-
ments.
Some courts employ language that appears to push in the di-
rection of this sort of clear-cut approach, but none has gone quite
189. Right after the passage of the 1976 Act, the D.C. Circuit proposed this approach.
See Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 803-04 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (calling the reference to
conceptual separability an "isolated reference" and requiring physical separability for pro-
tection). However, courts considering the issue later nearly uniformly rejected the idea.
See, e.g., Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1144 (2d Cir. 1987)
(allowing for a showing of physical or conceptual separability). In addition, Michael Lynch
proposed an approach based on physical separability alone, but the courts have yet to take
up his suggestion. See Lynch, supra note 15, at 662.
190. Professor Denicola references this approach and dismisses it as insufficiently pro-
tective of aesthetic, original expression. See Denicola, supra note 16, at 730.
656 [Vol. 48:611
COPYRIGHT/PATENT BOUNDARY
so far, perhaps because it is not entirely consistent with the stat-
utory language and the legislative history."' In Pivot Point, for
example, the Seventh Circuit reads the statutory definition of pic-
torial, graphic, and sculptural works to provide "a single, inte-
grated standard to determine when there is sufficient separate-
ness between the utilitarian and artistic aspects of a work to
justify copyright protection."'9 2 The court goes on, though, to reject
a test limited to a physical separability inquiry, asserting that it
is not helpful in the context of two-dimensional works."' In
Brandir, the court cited Nimmer and similarly concluded that
works could be protected if the aesthetic elements were either
physically or conceptually separable.'9 4 "'Conceptual separability'
is thus alive and well, at least in this circuit.""' Courts have ad-
hered to the notion of conceptual separability-which is the piece
of the useful article doctrine that has provoked so much difficul-
ty-because that language comes out of the legislative history'9
and also perhaps out of a concern for excluding otherwise copy-
rightable works from protection.
While the legislative history is, of course, significant, it certain-
ly carries less weight than the language of the statute, which does
not mention the phrase "conceptual separability." The statute
does not mention physical separability either. Instead, the defini-
tion of a "pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work" states:
191. See, e.g., Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 418 (2d Cir.
1985). But cf. Esquire, 591 F.2d at 803-04 (applying a physical separability standard).
192. Pivot Point Int'l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 921 (7th Cir. 2004).
193. Id. at 922 (stating that "[w]hen a three-dimensional article is the focus of the in-
quiry, reliance on physical separability can no doubt be a helpful tool in ascertaining
whether the artistic material in question can be separated from the industrial design," but
indicating that "such an approach really is not of much use when the item in question is
two-dimensional"); see also Denicola, supra note 16, at 744-75. Two-dimensional works
are, however, less likely to be "useful articles" subject to any kind of separability analysis.
Nearly all of the problematic cases seem to arise with respect to "sculptural" works. See,
e.g., Vermont, supra note 143, at 95 (cataloging a variety of seemingly useful three-
dimensional items that have been registered with the Copyright Office and concluding
that it is whether items are "constrained" rather than whether they are "separable" that
should be the decisive factor).
194. Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1144 ("Looking to the section 101 definition of works of artis-
tic craftsmanship requiring that artistic features be 'capable of existing independently of
the utilitarian aspects,' Professor Nimmer queries whether that requires physical as dis-
tinguished from conceptual separability, but answers his query by saying '[t]here is reason
to conclude that it does not."') (citing 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[B] at 2-96.1 (1986)).
195. Id.
196. Notably, however, it is not in the statute. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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[T]he design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be
considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to
the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculp-
tural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable
of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.
There is nothing in the language of the statute that compels con-
sideration of conceptual separability. Indeed, it is possible to in-
terpret the language as involving a physical separability test and
no more.
To be sure, such an approach is not mandated by the statute,
but its clarity and ease of application, as well as its effectiveness
at channeling works away from copyright mean that it has much
to recommend it. Applying the default rule and the physical sepa-
rability test to the facts in a few of the leading cases demon-
strates the workability and appeal of the approach.
In the Brandir case involving the "ribbon" bicycle rack, applica-
tion of the bright-line rule would be straightforward."' The ribbon
rack certainly has aesthetic appeal and artistic elements, but
those elements cannot be physically separated from the useful
aspects of the bicycle rack. Thus the ribbon rack would receive no
copyright protection.
Kieselstein-Cord, another casebook staple, is a case that should
have been much easier than it was, and it would be straightfor-
ward under the bright-line test proposed here."' The Second Cir-
cuit went through a rather complicated discussion of conceptual
separability to reach the conclusion that the aesthetic elements
were indeed separable and thus predictable.20 ' These contortions
were likely unnecessary. Although it is difficult to find good pho-
tographs or other representations of the specific belt buckle at is-
sue in the case, it appears that the functional belt-buckle aspects
of work were very likely physically separable from the expressive
elements of Kieselstein-Cord's work.20 ' As with the Mickey Mouse
telephone, one can imagine using some kind of tool to remove the
belt buckle clasp, leaving a completely useless, though aestheti-
197. Id. (emphasis added).
198. Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1143.
199. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
200. See id. at 993.
201. See COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY, http://www.coolcopyright.
com/cases/chp4/kieselsteinpearl.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2013).
658 [Vol. 48:611
COPYRIGHT/PATENT BOUNDARY
cally appealing, piece of metal. Thus under any approach, this
ought to have been an easy case and the plaintiff ought to have
prevailed (on the protectability question, at least; infringement is
another matter).
The mannequin case, Carol Barnhart, presents a slightly dif-
ferent question. In that case, the court held that there was nei-
ther physical nor conceptual separability.202 It is possible to con-
ceive of the human-like shaping as physically separable from the
mannequin forms. That is, one could take a file and scrape off the
slight indentations that hint at human anatomy and leave the
forms still functional for displaying items of clothing. On the oth-
er hand, the best approach for the courts to take in this kind of
case-and there have been a number of mannequin cases that
seem to present great difficulties20 3-is to take the burden of proof
seriously and simply require a strong showing by the plaintiff
that the aesthetic elements it seeks to protect are physically sep-
arable from the useful aspects. If that is not demonstrated, in the
close cases, the courts should err on the side of "not copyright,"
thus ensuring that useful items do not receive the protection of
copyright.
As should be apparent from these examples, the presumption
of "not copyright," along with the physical separability test, oper-
ates as a rather blunt channeling tool. This strong default is ap-
propriate if one assumes that overprotection is more of a problem
than underprotection. There are a number of reasons to believe
that this is the case. First, the legislative history of the useful ar-
ticle doctrine provisions in the Copyright Act indicates that useful
articles are not to receive copyright protection. Second, the useful
article doctrine is meant to act as a channeling rule, and the
channeling function of the rule is best served by a bright-line
rule.
One objection to this proposed test will be that the better and
more effective the industrial design, the more likely it is that the
aesthetic and functional elements will merge, becoming inter-
twined and interdependent. This is almost certainly true. Apple's
202. Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 1985).
203. See, e.g., Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 86 F.3d 320, 321 (2d Cir.
1996) (fish mannequins); Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply
Co., 74 F.3d 488, 491 (4th Cir. 1996) (animal mannequins); Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at
412 (human torso mannequins).
2014] 659
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
iPhone is likely one such example, and the Ribbon bicycle rack is
another. The very best industrial design will seamlessly integrate
form and function. But the merger of the useful and the beautiful
will not stand in the way of patent protection, if that is otherwise
available.204 To hold otherwise is to allow copyright law to regular-
ly protect useful articles. Indeed, the Brandir case provides the
perfect example of an item of industrial design that perhaps
might have attained patent protection.205 Regardless, a robust
useful article doctrine will regularly perform the channeling func-
tion that occurred only with great difficulty in the Brandir case.
On balance, it is likely a good thing-a boon for the public inter-
est-to allow free copying of a new and useful design that does
not meet the requirements of patentability. If it is believed that
some additional incentive is necessary for industrial designers,
such protection would be better provided through a sui generis
scheme of protection. Copyright is simply not the right home for
industrial design.
2. Adapting Trademark's Functionality Doctrine for Copyright
Law
An alternative to the rather blunt approach proposed above is
to adopt the details of trademark's functionality test, along with
its burden-shifting. In TrafFix v. MDI, the Supreme Court made
quite clear that it was willing to sacrifice some degree of accura-
cy, and some level of protection, in order to cleanly channel func-
tional items to the patent realm.206 While the physical separability
test described above would certainly achieve this same result, so
might trademark's functionality test.20 7
As described above, the Supreme Court in TrafFix v. MDI
pointedly referenced the Lanham Act's burden-shifting approach
204. Mark McKenna and Katherine Strandburg have proposed that it is the design pa-
tent system that ought to protect works that integrate form and function. See McKenna &
Strandburg, supra note 20, at 43-45.
205. See Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
206. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34-35 (2001).
207. Another alternative would be to apply a version of patent law's utility doctrine.
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (requiring that an invention be new, useful, and nonobvious). In
patent law, this functions as a low hurdle. If an item is "totally incapable of achieving a
useful result," a patent will be denied. Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, 977
F.2d 1555, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Borrowing from this doctrine, copyright law could re-
quire the copyright proponent to demonstrate this its article (or the aspects of the article it
seeks to protect with copyright) is "totally incapable of achieving a useful result." Id.
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and held that MDI was not entitled to trade dress protection for
the dual-spring design of its traffic signs.208 In reaching this con-
clusion, the Court applied the test that it had developed through
a series of cases: a product feature is functional-and therefore
cannot be trademarked-"[1] if it is essential to the use or pur-
pose of the article or [2] if it affects the cost or quality of the arti-
cle."20 The Court clarified that if a product feature is functional
under either of these formulations, any further inquiry is unnec-
essary.21 Moreover, functionality will bar trade dress protection
even when the design or product feature would otherwise be pro-
tected.211 In other words, for example, TrafFix would have pre-
vailed even if MDI had been able to demonstrate that the dual-
spring design was source-identifying and that secondary meaning
had developed. Functionality trumps any countervailing trade-
mark concerns or policy.212
It is with some hesitation that this article proposes the migra-
tion of trademark's functionality doctrine to copyright law. The
doctrine-and in particular the Court's test described here-have
been roundly criticized by scholars.12 It has, however, been
adopted and applied by the federal courts, who have gained expe-
208. See supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
209. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Qualitex Co.
v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995)).
210. Id. at 33 ("Where the design is functional under the Inwood formulation there is
no need to proceed further to consider if there is a competitive necessity for the feature. In
Qualitex, by contrast, esthetic functionality was the central question, there having been no
indication that the green-gold color of the laundry press pad had any bearing on the use or
purpose of the product or its cost or quality."). In other words, some product features may
be deemed functional even if they are not functional under the traditional formulation, but
a feature that is functional under one of the two prongs is functional regardless of other
potential tests or inquiries.
211. It bears mentioning that the functionality doctrine need only be applied to "trade
dress" and not to trademarks used on goods or service marks. Similarly, the useful article
doctrine applies only to pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works. In other words, in both
trademark and copyright, Congress has expressed an intent to exclude items of industrial
design. The utility/functionality limitation does not generally apply to a whole variety of
works protected by copyright law and by trademark law. This helps to clarify that works
at the boundary of copyright or trademark law may present some unique issues for the
broader IP regime.
212. Mark McKenna has described functionality as the only true trademark "defense"
because of this way in which it negates a trademark proponent's claims. See McKenna,
supra note 73, at 823-24, 857. Of course, not all courts actually treat it this way. See, e.g.,
Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 224-25,
228 (2d Cir. 2012) (determining that functionally is to be assessed after deciding whether
the mark "merits protection" and concluding that since the mark merited protection only
as modified, functionality did not need to be assessed).
213. See, e.g., McKenna, supra note 73, at 824.
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rience with the rule. While this is certainly not sufficient by itself
to justify the adoption of the doctrine into copyright law, there
are practical and theoretical reasons to apply a test that (1) al-
ready has the Supreme Court's imprimatur and (2) serves the
same purpose in trademark law that the useful article doctrine is
meant to serve in copyright law.214 This second point is crucial.
Trademark's functionality doctrine looks primarily not at trade-
mark law issues (source identification, consumer behavior, etc.)
but at a patent law question. As suggested above, the useful arti-
cle doctrine in copyright law is not really about copyright law, but
all of the tests that have been so far employed focus on copyright
law, on what is aesthetic or expression or art and so on. A test
that hones in not on what might be protected, but instead on
what ought not be protected better captures the purpose of the
doctrine.
It is in this way that trademark's functionality doctrine would
be an improvement over any of the current variations of the use-
ful article doctrine and the tests for conceptual separability. The
functionality test asks whether a product feature is "essential" to
the use or purpose of the item.215 If it is, then it may not receive
trade dress protection. Alternatively, the test asks whether the
product feature affects the cost or quality of the article.2 16 If so,
again, the item will not receive trade dress protection. Both of
these inquiries seek to ferret out the useful aspects of items, leav-
ing them in the public domain unless they qualify for patent pro-
tection. This focus on the channeling function, even if it fails to
create a perfect test, at least directs practitioners and courts to-
ward the underlying policy purpose.
A copyright functionality test would place the burden on the
proponent, requiring proof that the aspects sought to be protected
are not functional-or useful-by demonstrating that they are not
essential to the item's operation and do not affect the cost or qual-
214. Courts and practitioners have struggled in particular with the concept of "aesthet-
ic functionality," and an alternative test has developed over time. It seems unlikely, how-
ever, that it would be necessary to import aesthetic functionality into copyright law as the
point of aesthetic functionality is to preclude trademark protection for items that are not
mechanically useful but nonetheless serve important (usually competition-related) pur-
poses. There is simply less need for this in copyright law, as it is not directed so clearly
toward consumers and the marketplace.





ity of the item.21" This approach addresses directly the policy goal
of confining protection for useful articles to the patent realm,
though it is certainly less predictable and more difficult to apply
than the bright-line rule of the physical separability approach.
Nonetheless, it may be the more pragmatic option as it is the test
already adopted by the Court to achieve a purpose similar to that
required in the copyright context. Doing so would have many sal-
utary effects: it is a rule that flows directly from federal intellec-
tual property policy; it is a rule that draws a much clearer line
between copyright and patent law; it is likely to be more predict-
able than the current tests; and it avoids the need for courts to
make artistic judgments and for parties to manipulate the evi-
dence to suit their ends. In addition, and perhaps most im-
portantly in terms of practicability, it is a test that has been sanc-
tioned by the Supreme Court and applied by the lower courts. 18
And while it is true that it sacrifices accuracy, this precise sacri-
fice has been acknowledged and endorsed by the Court. Just as
there will be some source-identifying product designs that do not
receive trademark protection, there will be some fixed, original,
expressive works that do not receive copyright protection. This
would go a long way toward ensuring that useful or functional
items are excluded from copyright protection.
It is helpful to think about the rule in operation. With respect
to Brandir, the bicycle rack incorporates both useful and aesthet-
ic elements, and Brandir bears the burden of identifying the ele-
ments it seeks to protect and showing that those elements are
neither essential to the use or purpose of work nor that they af-
fect the cost or quality. In that case, this would be quite a heavy
burden indeed. It is apparent that the Ribbon rack incorporates
aesthetic elements, but it is very difficult to identify either the
aesthetic or the useful elements in any effective way, and they
certainly are not physically separable. Moreover, even if that
were possible as a rhetorical or semantic matter, Brandir would
face an uphill battle to demonstrate that the design features it
sought to protect with copyright law do not affect the quality of
the article. As was discussed in the case, the shape and size of the
217. Id. at 35 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10
(1982)) ("Whether a utility patent has expired or there has been no utility patent at all, a
product design which has a particular appearance may be functional because it is 'essen-
tial to the use or purpose of the article' or 'affects the cost or quality of the article."').
218. See, e.g., id. at 32.
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curving rails are exactly what make it work as a bike rack.219
Thus, the design features certainly "affect the cost or quality."
Although Brandir might argue that the particular size and shape
of the curving rails are not "essential," the Supreme Court has
held that competitive necessity is not the appropriate test. 220 That
is, there is no need to "design around" a competitor's product, nor
does the defendant have to demonstrate that there is no other
way to design the useful article.' Merely because there are other
possible ways to design a bike rack does not mean that Brandir
should receive protection for its particular configuration.
In Kieselstein-Cord, the case concerning the belt buckle, the
dispute should have been easier to resolve.222 In that case, Kie-
selstein-Cord could have "identified separately" the aesthetic and
functional elements of the belt buckles. Doing so would have re-
sulted in protection for the curved design. As becomes clear with
this case, the requirement that the non-useful aspects of the work
be identified by the copyright proponent becomes something akin
to a physical separability test. That is as it should be, and those
cases are the easy ones.
It is when physical separability is not possible that the courts
have struggled. The approach proposed here is hardly a panacea
in those cases, but shifting the burden to the copyright proponent
and making clear that the default is one of no protection ought to
take the pressure off the difficult cases. In other words, this ap-
proach frankly acknowledges that "getting it right" is less im-
portant than other countervailing concerns. The first alternative
proposed above takes this tack most explicitly but the trademark
functionality test is likely to serve this purpose as well.
219. Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1147 (2d Cir. 1987).
220. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33-34 (citation omitted) ('There is no need, furthermore, to
engage, as did the Court of Appeals, in speculation about other design possibilities, such
as using three or four springs which might serve the same purpose. Here, the functionality
of the spring design means that competitors need not explore whether other spring juxta-
positions might be used. The dual-spring design is not an arbitrary flourish in the configu-
ration of MDI's product; it is the reason the device works. Other designs need not be at-
tempted.").
221. Id. at 34 ("Because the dual-spring design is functional, it is unnecessary for com-
petitors to explore designs to hide the springs, say, by using a box or framework to cover
them, as suggested by the Court of Appeals.").
222. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories By Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
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The mannequin cases, Carol Barnhart and Pivot Point, present
one of the most vexing scenarios.223 In Carol Barnhart, which in-
volved human torso forms used for displaying clothing, the func-
tionality test would ask the copyright proponent to demonstrate
that the aspects of the work sought to be protected (presumably
the shaping creating the form of a button-down shirt and the
shaping that indicates a human chest) are not "essential" to the
use or operation of the item and that they do not affect the cost or
quality of the torso forms.224 It would be quite difficult for the
owner to convincingly demonstrate both of these. In order to dis-
play, for example, a shirt, a tie, and a sweater on a mannequin, it
is at least very helpful, if not essential, to have the shape of a
human form and it certainly makes the mannequin work better
as a mannequin. A torso meant to display women's shirts displays
those shirts more effectively if the mannequin has a shape that is
similar to a human female shape. Likewise in Pivot Point, the
mannequin head works better as a tool for stylists because it
mimics the human form.225 In both cases, the plaintiff would have
quite a difficult time overcoming the burden of proof to demon-
strate non-usefulness (or functionality). In neither case should
the mannequin be protected by copyright law.
This approach does, admittedly, run contrary to some signifi-
cant copyright principles. Namely, the notion that for most ideas
there can be a wide variety of expression such that the expression
is protectable without hurting either competition or innovation.
As with the functionality doctrine in trademark law, however, the
useful article doctrine can be seen as serving purposes important
enough to overcome these objections. The useful article doctrine
should, as with trademark functionality, trump other copyright
concerns. In other words, even if a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
work is fixed, original expression, it ought not receive copyright
protection if it is a useful article. As described above, this is for
patent law reasons. In addition, it operates only with respect to
223. Pivot Point Int'l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2004); Carol
Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985); see also Superior Form
Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., Inc., 74 F.3d 488 (4th Cir. 1996); Hart
v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 86 F.3d 320 (2d Cir. 1996) (addressing the differ-
ences and similarities of taxidermy and mannequins as copyrightable sculptural works).
224. Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 412. For an image of the human torso forms at issue,
see COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY, http://www.coolcopyright.com/cases/
chp4/barnharteconomy.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2013).
225. Pivot Point, 372 F.3d at 931.
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pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, so that it is an exception
or carve-out that is unlikely to lead to a slippery slope.226
CONCLUSION
The approach proposed here will admittedly result in the ex-
clusion from copyright protection of original expression that
would in every other respect qualify. But this is as it should be.
Rather than contorting the statute or the reasoning to ferret out
every original, aesthetic aspect of a work, copyright law ought to
frankly acknowledge that it cannot get it right every time and
that the policy concerns animating the useful article doctrine,
which stretch beyond copyright to the broader intellectual proper-
ty system, trump the narrower copyright concerns.
226. Of course there will always be issues at the margins. Disputes might arise over
whether a work is a "pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work" or a "literary work." Designers
might well seek to characterize their works as literary works to avoid the scrutiny of the
useful article doctrine.
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